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MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
Jud Mathews* 
A persistent challenge for the American administrative state is reconciling the vast 
powers of unelected agencies with our commitment to government by the people. Many 
features of contemporary administrative law—from the right to participate in agency 
processes, to the reason-giving requirements on agencies, to the presidential review of 
rulemaking—have been justified, at least in part, as means to square the realities of 
agency power with our democratic commitments. At the root of any such effort there lies 
a theory of democracy, whether fully articulated or only implicit: some conception of 
what democracy is about, and what democracy requires.  
While several conceptions of democracy have influenced administrative law over the 
years, administrative law has never come to terms with a strand of democratic thought 
that I term democratic minimalism. Democratic minimalists argue that conventional 
theories of democracy set unrealistic benchmarks to evaluate government practices, 
because they expect more than is reasonable of citizens, leaders, and institutions. 
Accordingly, minimalists seek to offer a less ambitious, more attainable account of 
democratic governance that nonetheless captures core normative commitments.  
This Article presents the first account of minimally democratic administrative law. The 
Article identifies the conceptions of democracy that have dominated thinking about 
administrative law to this point and highlights challenges to them before outlining a 
competing, minimalist conception of democracy. It then revisits contemporary debates 
over how courts should review agency action from a minimalist standpoint. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
The administrative state seems to have a democracy problem. On the 
conventional telling, the exercise of public power in a democracy is 
legitimate only to the extent that it can be traced back to “the people,” 
who are ultimately sovereign. In a representative democracy, elections 
link officeholders to the public, and thereby legitimate their use of the 
coercive powers of state. It is more complicated to give an account of 
why unelected agency officials may legitimately exercise public power in 
a democracy, precisely because the electoral connection is missing. The 
more that agencies are making substantive policy choices with the force 
of law (as opposed to merely carrying out policies chosen by the 
legislature), the more acute the democratic problem appears. And the 
volume of substantive policy choices made by modern agencies in the 
United States is simply staggering.1  
Not surprisingly, concern over the democratic legitimacy of 
administrative power, together with related concerns over its 
constitutionality, have been abiding preoccupations for scholars, 
officials, and reformers. In 1937, President Roosevelt’s Committee on 
Administrative Management darkly warned of the power reposed in the 
“headless fourth branch of government.”2 Forty years later, James 
Freedman noted the “recurrent sense of crisis” that has afflicted 
administrative law for more than a century, with many of the concerns 
relating to the democratic bona fides of administrative action.3  
The notion that administrative power threatens democratic governance 
persists. Writing for the Court a few terms ago, Chief Justice Roberts 
opined that “[t]he growth of the Executive Branch, which now wields 
vast power and touches almost every aspect of daily life, heightens the 
                                                       
1 As one measure, the Fall 2015 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and 
Deregulatory Actions lists 2,244 active rulemakings, of which 149 are 
“economically significant,” meaning that they have an impact of $100 million 
or more on the economy. Introduction to the Unified Agenda of Federal 
Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 80 Fed. Reg. 77709 (Dec. 15, 2015). Data 
from the Unified Agenda is available at Reginfo, www.reginfo.gov (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2016). 
2 PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MANAGEMENT, REPORT WITH SPECIAL 
STUDIES 37 (1937). 
3 JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 6 (1978). 
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concern that it may slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that 
of the people.”4 Still more recently, Columbia Professor Philip 
Hamburger argued in his 2014 book Is Administrative Power Unlawful? 
that “administrative law is the contemporary expression of the tendency 
toward absolute power—toward consolidated power outside and above 
the law.”5  
Crucially, democratic concerns about administrative power are not 
purely academic. To the contrary, they have inspired significant changes 
to the administrative process and administrative law doctrine over the 
past half century. Judges, scholars, and policymakers have participated 
in major efforts to rethink and restructure how administrative power is 
exercised. An aim of most of these efforts has been to make the 
administrative state function in a matter more compatible with our 
democratic commitments. 
This is true of the judicial innovations that opened the informal 
rulemaking process and judicial review to wider sets of stakeholders in 
the 1960s and 1970s.6 These developments expanded opportunities for 
“the people” to participate in self-government—not by voting, but by 
articulating their views in the agency policymaking process (or, if need 
be, in court). It is also true of the jurisprudence, dating from the same 
period, that demanded exhaustively reasoned decision making from 
agencies.7 A robust justification from the agency offers assurance that 
                                                       
4 Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 561 
U. S. 477, 499 (2010). 
5 PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 16 (2014). 
Spoiler alert: his answer is yes. For a different perspective, see Adrian 
Vermeule, No. Review of Is Administrative Law Unlawful? by Philip 
Hamburger, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547 (2015). Justice Thomas cited Hamburger’s 
book numerous times in his concurrence in Department of Transportation v. 
Association of American Railroads, 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1242-44 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
6 See, e.g., Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) 
(broadening the test for standing under the Administrative Procedure Act and 
thereby permitting a broader set of claimants to challenge agency action in 
court); Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (setting aside the grant of a television license for failure to 
allow a public interest group intervene). 
7 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) 
(applying “hard look” review to the rescission of a rule by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration); United States v. Nova Scotia Food 
Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (setting aside an agency decision for 
failure to respond adequately to an argument made by a regulated party during 
the notice and comment process). 
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its decision was the product of careful and comprehensive deliberation 
about what policy choices best serve the common good. Likewise, 
moves to strengthen the President’s role in administration, both 
through judicial doctrines and also through structural changes to the 
administrative process, have also been justified with reference to 
democratic values. If the President serves as the people’s tribune in 
government, amplifying her ability to use executive branch agencies to 
pursue her agenda is pro-democratic. 
All of these concerns, and the reforms they have inspired, rest on 
conceptions of democracy, whether implicit or explicit. In other words, 
at the root of each lies some idea of what democracy is, and what 
democracy requires. A conception of democracy involves both 
normative and positive elements: it expresses a political ideal, grounded 
in an understanding of how institutions of government can actually 
work. For instance: Some people may believe that democracy is 
fundamentally a matter of aggregating the preferences of individuals 
into policies that reflect the wishes of the majority. Others, that 
democracy is at heart about pursuing a shared vision of the common 
good, which is forged through collective deliberation. It matters how 
we think about democracy, because different theories of democracy 
underwrite different ideas about how the institutions of government 
should function. Indeed, some practices that are democracy-enhancing 
on one theory of democracy may actually have anti-democratic 
consequences on a different understanding of how democracy works. 
A pluralist conception of democracy, which emphasizes competition 
among interest groups as the engine of public policy making, shaped the 
design of the administrative process and the development of 
administrative law in the decades following World War II. A number 
of administrative law practices also resonate with civic republican 
theory, which emphasizes how constructive engagement and dialogue 
can generate public-regarding consensus on policy matters. More recent 
moves towards presidential control implicitly appeal to a plebiscitary 
model of democracy, in which the President’s actions enjoy a privileged 
legitimacy because the President is elected by the people as a whole. But 
administrative law has never had an open and sustained engagement 
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with a strand of political theory that I call democratic minimalism.8 I 
argue that it is time to do so. 
Democratic minimalism is not a single theory so much as an orientation 
towards thinking about democracy. Minimalist theories are united by 
an interest in reducing the gap between theorizing and democratic 
practice. Minimalist theories of democracy are “minimalist” in that they 
set a lower bar for what it means to be democratic than most traditional 
theories. Minimalists characteristically argue that conventional theories 
of democracy are unrealistic as benchmarks to evaluate government 
practices, because they expect more than is reasonable of citizens, 
leaders, and institutions. Accordingly, minimalists seek to offer a less 
ambitious and more attainable account of democracy that nonetheless 
captures core democratic commitments. While minimalism has a 
historical pedigree, this way of thinking about democracy has received 
renewed attention from political theorists in recent years.9 
One reason to engage with democratic minimalism is that there are 
reasons to suspect that the conceptions of democracy that have long 
dominated administrative law thinking may be poor guides to 
structuring our administrative practices. Pluralist and civic republican 
models of democracy have come in for forceful critiques that the 
standards they set for the institutions of government are unobtainable. 
What is more, courts’ valiant but doomed efforts to hold the 
administrative process to these standards can lead to outcomes that are 
undesirable by anyone’s lights. On the other hand, presidentialists may 
go too far the other direction, if they take the view that democracy 
requires nothing more than empowering an elected executive. Crucially, 
minimalists address the shortcomings of traditional theory not by 
abandoning democratic goals altogether, but instead by adjusting 
expectations for what government can achieve. If it does not make sense 
                                                       
8 See, e.g., Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in 
DEMOCRACY’S VALUES 23 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 
1999). Some scholars use the phrase “minimalist conception of democracy” to 
denote purely procedural accounts of democracy. Procedural theories of 
democracy hold that any political outcomes reached through fair procedures 
are ipso facto democratically legitimate. See COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, 
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT 11-12 
(2007). As I use the term, democratic minimalism does not exclude theories 
that impose substantive criteria for democracy (such as the principle of non-
domination, discussed further below).  
9 See infra note 132. 
 
 
 
 
6 MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
 
 
to measure democratic success by the lights of traditional theory, then 
we require different and more realistic benchmarks for democratic 
success, and minimalist theories aim to provide them.10 
This Article is the first to outline a conception of minimally democratic 
administrative law—that is, to assess the administrative process against 
a minimalist conception of democracy. This vantage point of 
minimalism offers a fresh perspective on a set of long-running and 
important debates within administrative law. This Article focuses on 
one of the central scholarly preoccupations of administrative law—
judicial review—and evaluates existing practices from a minimalist 
perspective. What emerges is a new account of the role judicial review 
should play in administrative law that at the same time resonates with 
some influential contemporary arguments.  
In the minimalist conception of democracy outlined below, the core 
task of a court reviewing agency action is to protect against domination: 
the abusive or arbitrary interference with persons’ basic interests. 
Reorienting judicial review towards this end requires a redistribution of 
judicial scrutiny. Most of the time, courts should engage only in a low-
intensity, “reasonableness” review. More judicial scrutiny is triggered by 
circumstances that suggest a high risk of domination: in particular, 
outcomes so seriously disadvantageous to affected parties that it appears 
the agency may have disregarded their interests entirely. Under these 
circumstances, the agency will face a higher burden of justification.  
The minimalist conception offers new perspectives on other aspects of 
judicial review, including the reason-giving requirement that is a 
cornerstone of contemporary administrative law. Civic republicans 
could argue that setting very high standards for deliberation and 
                                                       
10 Democratic minimalism is not to be confused with other “minimalisms” that 
have received attention from legal scholars in recent years, notably judicial 
minimalism and Burkean minimalism, which is a traditionalist variant of 
judicial minimalism. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006). What these 
approaches arguably do share with democratic minimalism is a “less is more” 
ethos, which counsels that asking too much of institutions often leads them 
into error. The approach outlined here is also not to be confused with what is 
sometimes called “minimal rationality review” in administrative law, which 
amounts to rational basis review. See Ernest M. Jones, A Component Approach 
to Minimal Rationality Review of Agency Rulemaking, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 275 
(1987).  
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justification is necessary to ensure the legitimacy of agency policy 
choices. And as judicial review is currently practiced, as a practical 
matter agencies must be prepared to show that they carefully considered 
every alternative, and that the choice they made was superior to the 
alternatives. From a minimalist perspective, there is ordinarily no need 
for the justificatory burden on agencies to be so demanding, with the 
result that agencies can offer a wider class of reasons to justify their 
actions. Also, contemporary judicial review doctrine makes agency 
inaction almost unreviewable. Recognizing that agency neglect can also 
amount to domination, minimalism favors more symmetrical treatment 
of agency action and inaction. 11 
Democratic minimalism aligns with, and provides some theoretical 
ballast for, certain ideas that enjoy some currency in contemporary 
administrative law. Commentators have long observed the gap between 
what administrative law promises and what it delivers when it comes to 
measures aimed at enhancing the legitimacy of administrative 
outcomes. In particular, some scholars have argued that imposing 
additional justification requirements on agency decision makers can 
ossify the rulemaking process, with welfare-reducing results,12 and have 
advanced proposals to “de-ossify” the process, including by making 
judicial review less demanding.13 Furthermore, some have argued that, 
in practice, courts do conduct judicial review at least loosely along the 
                                                       
11 For more detail on all of these arguments, see infra Part IV. 
12 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of 
Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 
1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7 (1991). 
13 See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Sidney Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Eight 
Things Americans Can’t Figure Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 
ADMIN. L. REV. 5 (2009). For a skeptical reaction, see Mark Seidenfeld, 
Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review 
or Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997). Works in this 
vein share the sense that imposing exacting requirements on agencies can 
make the perfect (i.e., the highest standards of participation or justification) 
into the enemy of the good (i.e., timely, effective regulatory responses to real 
problems). Sidney Shapiro taps into this idea when he advocates what he calls 
pragmatic administrative law. Shapiro rejects any sort of grand theory as a 
benchmark for administrative practices, and counsels instead “to measure the 
worthiness of an idea by its operation in actual experience, rather than by its 
consistency with the precepts of one particular theory or another.” Sidney A. 
Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, Issues in Legal Scholarship (2005).  
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lines of the proposal developed here, varying the intensity of review 
depending on what is at stake.14  
Democratic minimalism complements these lines of scholarship and on-
the-ground developments in important ways. Administrative law does 
not lack for concrete proposals to streamline, improve, and otherwise 
reform the administrative process.15 But these proposals tend not to 
engage, at least in much depth, with debates over what makes the 
exercise of administrative power legitimate in a democracy. This Article 
offers an organizing frame for assessments of contemporary 
administrative practice, linking them to these broader theoretical 
concerns. In this way, this Article helps bring together two ongoing, 
largely separate conservations: one about administrative reform, and the 
other about political theory.  
The Article is organized as follows. Part II characterizes the main 
strands of democratic thought that have influenced administrative law 
thinkers and highlights how these perspectives have influenced changes 
to administrative practice over the past half century. Part III then 
outlines the minimalist challenge to these ways of thinking about 
democracy, and describes an alternative democratic ideal, rooted in the 
concept of non-domination. Part IV assesses a number of features of 
judicial review from the perspective of democratic minimalism. Part V 
discusses some objections, and concludes.  
II. DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
This Part aims to identify the strands of democratic theory that have 
been most influential within administrative law over the past half 
century, to highlight the features of contemporary administrative law 
that correspond to these different ways of thinking about democracy, 
and to identify the principle critiques directed at each. I focus on three 
                                                       
14 Lisa Bressman & Glen Staszewski, Judicial Review of Agency Discretion, in A 
GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 
(Michael Herz, Richard W. Murphy, & Kathryn A. Watts eds., 2015) (“In 
practice, the grounds for setting aside an agency action under the arbitrary-
and-capricious test vary according to the nature and magnitude of that action. 
Thus, a court typically will apply the criteria set forth in this chapter rigorously 
during judicial review of high-stakes rulemaking proceedings . . . , but much 
more leniently when reviewing for example, an adjudicative matter that an 
agency would be expected to dispose of quickly.”). 
15 See supra note 13. 
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broad families of democratic theory, which I describe as (1) pluralist, (2) 
civic republican, and (3) presidentialist.  
It is simply not possible, in the context of this Article, to do justice to 
the sophistication and diversity of American democratic thought over 
several decades. My account necessarily relies on simplifications, not 
least in the way I wrangle the wide-ranging works of diverse thinkers 
into three discrete categories.16 But for present purposes, these labels 
suffice to illustrate the main lines of influence democratic theory has 
had on administrative law.  
A. Pluralism 
1. Pluralist Theory  
Pluralism was the dominant theory of democracy in midcentury 
America, though it had had its first season of influence in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s.17 In fact, it may understate the influence of pluralism to 
refer to it as a political theory at all. At a time before political theory 
emerged as a niche subfield separate from the broader currents of 
political science, pluralism was more a set of operating assumptions 
common to most American political scientists who studied American 
government (which at the time was most American political scientists).18  
To understand pluralism, it helps to know what it was an argument 
against. For the second half of the nineteenth century, most efforts to 
                                                       
16 In particular, deliberative democracy theorists might bristle at being forced 
to share the civic republican label. While theorists of deliberative democracy 
would be correct to insist that they deserve an entry of their own in an 
encyclopedia of political theory, see, e.g., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL 
THEORY (Mark Bevir ed., 2010) (offering separate entries for deliberative 
democracy and civic republicanism), the similarities of their prescriptions for 
the administrative process warrant their treatment as a unit here. See Section 
II.B below. 
17 JOHN G. GUNNELL, IMAGINING THE AMERICAN POLITY: POLITICAL 
SCIENCE AND THE DISCOURSE OF DEMOCRACY 22 (2004). Arthur Bentley 
introduced the pluralist conception of politics to American political science in 
his book The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures, but his ideas only 
became widely influential later. For a readable description of Bentley’s book 
and its influence, see Nicholas Lemann, Conflict of Interest, THE NEW YORKER 
86-92 (Aug. 11, 2008). Not every prominent political science was a pluralist; 
E.E. Schattschneider is one notable exception. See E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, 
THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN 
AMERICA (1960). 
18 Id. at 4. 
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understand American government had been in thrall to the idea of “the 
state,” conceived not just as a set of institutions, but as an organic 
“sovereign society” that preexisted government.19 Among other things, 
this way of thinking about government has a sharply unitarian character, 
in that it presupposes an already existing, unitary state that finds 
expression in government.20  
Pluralists disagreed. The American people were an irreducibly diverse 
bunch, with an array of opposing interests, and efforts to bridge 
divisions in the service of a supervening common good were destined to 
fail. Americans simply did not come together as one when it came to 
matters of policy. Americans did, however, come together as many: they 
formed a multitude of groups with shared interests, or in the coinage 
popularized by David Truman, “interest groups.”21 Each of these groups 
pressed government to deliver public policies that favored its own 
interests. From a pluralist perspective, politics are fundamentally 
interest group politics, and the foremost task of government is to 
mediate among these competing interest group demands in forming 
policy.22  
The pluralist vision of government—of interest group politics—is an 
unromantic one. Even so, most mid-century pluralists were optimistic 
about the capacity of democratic government to produce good 
outcomes. With government subject to pressure from all sides, no one 
interest group could consistently call the shots. So long as numerous 
channels for applying pressure to government actors were open to all 
                                                       
19 JOHN G. GUNNELL, THE DESCENT OF POLITICAL THEORY: THE 
GENEALOGY OF AN AMERICAN VOCATION 29 (1993). 
20 The idea of the unitary state with an autonomous existence of its own was a 
persistent one, even as scholars sought to take a “scientific” approach to 
understanding government. A sentence from Columbia Professor Frank 
Goodnow’s presidential address at the first meeting of the American Political 
Science Association in 1905 vividly illustrates the point. Goodnow declared 
that the object of political scientists should be to consider “[t]he State, as an 
object of scientific study, . . . from the point of view of the various operations 
necessary to the realization of the State will.” FRANK J. GOODNOW, THE 
WORK OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION 37 (1905). 
21 DAVID BICKNELL TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL 
INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION 33 (1ST ED. 1951). 
22 Arthur Bentley introduced the pluralist conception of politics to American 
political science in a 1908 book, but the ideas only reached their apogee of 
influence after the Second World War. ARTHUR BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF 
GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SOCIAL PRESSURES (1908). 
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comers, the competition to shape policy was a fair fight. And many 
pluralists noted favorably the numerous access points in American 
government, including legislative lobbying, bureaucratic engagement, 
and public opinion campaigns. And as Robert Dahl emphasized, 
updating Madison’s argument from the Federalist #10, while one 
interest group might hold the upper hand on one issue, no class or group 
in the United States was likely to dominate across the board.23 
2. In Administrative Law 
The 1960s and 1970s were times of major change for the administrative 
process and administrative law. Many of these changes were introduced, 
at least in part, in an effort to bring administrative practices into better 
alignment with the nation’s democratic commitments. And the 
conception of democracy that many of the legislators, judges, 
administrators and scholars behind these efforts subscribed to, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, was a pluralist one.  
Administrative power is not problematic, from a democratic 
perspective, when agencies merely carry out instructions handed down 
from the people’s representatives in Congress—when they act as the 
“transmission belt” for legislative directives, as a popular Machine Age 
metaphor put it. This was the standard account into the early part of 
the twentieth century, when—for the most part—agencies operated 
with limited policy discretion.24 Administration could be conceived as a 
technical field, wholly separate from politics.25 But by midcentury, no 
one could seriously maintain this view. Newer agencies were outfitted 
with wide-ranging discretionary powers to set policy over diverse 
                                                       
23 ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRACY THEORY (1956); see also 
ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN 
AMERICAN CITY (1961). As John Gunnell notes, although Dahl “took pains to 
distance himself from Madison’s account [in A Preface to Democratic Theory], he 
developed a thesis that, in general terms, was nearly indistinguishable.” 
GUNNELL, supra note 17, at 232.  
24 For a recent revisionist view, emphasizing the substantial powers of agencies 
prior to the twentieth century, see Jerry L. Mashaw, CREATING THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF 
AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012). 
25 Woodrow Wilson took this view in an influential essay published in the late 
1880s, and several years later, Frank Goodnow published a book with the same 
starting premise. See FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND 
ADMINISTRATION (1900); Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 
POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887).  
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subjects. The question became, what made it legitimate for them to do 
so in a democracy? 
Pluralists had a ready answer. Policymaking by agencies can be 
democratic so long as interest groups have access to agencies, so that 
they can make their cases there. And at first, many pluralists believed 
that they would. So for instance, Kenneth Culp Davis in the late 1950s 
could dismiss concerns that the administrative process was biased 
towards certain policy outcomes, precisely because agencies were 
susceptible to influence from all quarters, including both interest groups 
and the other branches of government.26 Davis downplayed concerns 
over agency capture, arguing that regulatory regimes generally aim to 
balance public and private interests, and generally succeed in doing so.27 
Writing of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), Davis argues 
that “a finding that the ICC strikes some sort of workable balance 
among all of the conflicting interests affected is far from a finding of 
failure of the regulatory process, whatever the deficiencies of the 
ICC.”28   
This view of the administrative process also has implications for how 
courts should exercise their power of review over agencies: sparingly. If 
agencies are permeable to interest groups already, courts have no 
business undoing the deals struck among stakeholders. And so, 
consistent with this view, Davis counseled courts to sit on their hands 
when possible, arguing against judicial creation of new grounds for 
review, and advocating internal agency review instead.29  
Over time, though, it became harder and harder to maintain that kind 
of sunny optimism in the face of the persistent and conspicuous 
underperformance of agency government. By the beginning of the 
                                                       
26 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 14-23 (1958) 
(discussed in Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity: 
Administrative Law and the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-70, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 1389, 1408-09 (2000)). 
27 See Davis, supra note 26, at 19. 
28 Id. at 20. 
29 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 112 (1958) (“A 
limited judicial review does not weaken the administrative process but 
strengthens it.”) As Reuel Schiller describes, Davis’ rosy view of agencies’ 
capacity to self-regulate did not survive into the 1960s, and in later works, he 
advocated more aggressive judicial review to keep agencies in line. See Schiller, 
supra note 26, at 1415. 
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1960s, evidence was mounting that administrative process, left to its 
own devices, did not reliably incorporate the interests of relevant 
stakeholders to produce fair and even-handed policies.30 The mid-1950s 
to early 1960s saw the appearance of a number of influential 
postmortems dissecting agency failures.31 Most of these critical views 
arrived at a similar diagnosis of where the pluralist account broke down: 
agencies systematically favored the interests of the powerful or well-
connected over others. Instead of being open to all comers, the access 
points to agency influence might be closed off—an “iron triangle,” 
Theodore Lowi would later call it, linking favored interest groups, 
congressional subcommittees, and agencies, to the exclusion of others.32 
An imbalance of access helped to explain the curious problem of agency 
capture: agencies ended up serving precisely the interests of those 
parties they were supposed to be regulating.33 
If the administrative process, left to its own devices, produces bad 
outcomes, it is not necessarily appropriate for reviewing courts to sit on 
their hands. And indeed, starting in the 1960s, broad changes emerged 
in how judges approached judicial review over agencies. Reuel Schiller 
has characterized these changes as reflecting a rejection of interest 
group pluralism.34 I argue, to the contrary, that they show courts 
doubling down on a pluralist conception of democracy. Courts 
recognize agencies’ failure to even-handedly aggregate interest group 
preferences into policy, but they do not reject the pluralist premise that 
policies are properly forged out of the play of contending interest 
groups. I argue that many of the changes to judicial review in the 1960s 
and 1970s are best understood as efforts by courts to make the 
                                                       
30 See Schiller, supra note 26, at 1413. 
31 MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION (1955); Samuel Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The 
Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1952); JAMES 
LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 
(1960). 
32 THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND 
THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969). The phrase “iron triangle” was 
originally used to describe a regional stronghold bounded by three North 
Korean cities during the Korean conflict. WILLIAM SAFIRE, THE RIGHT 
WORD IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME: WIT AND WISDOM 
FROM THE POPULAR “ON LANGUAGE” COLUMN IN THE NEW YORK TIMES 
MAGAZINE 170-71 (2004). 
33 BERNSTEIN, supra note 31.  
34 See Schiller, supra note 26, at 1391-92. 
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administrative process more genuinely pluralist, by opening it up more 
fully to competing interests. 
A raft of judge-initiated changes to administrative law in the 1960s and 
1970s aimed to open the processes up more fully to those interests with 
a stake in the matter.35 Richard Stewart chronicled these changes in his 
magisterial 1975 article The Reformation of Administrative Law.36 Courts 
broadened access to administration in a number of ways. First, they 
expanded opportunities to intervene in on-the-record adjudications, the 
trial-type proceedings that were the prototypical form of agency action 
until the 1970s. Notably, in Office of Communication of the United Church 
of Christ v. FCC,37 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated the 
grant of a television license because the agency had failed to permit a 
church with an interest in civil rights intervene in the licensing 
proceeding. According to the Court, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) simply could not vindicate the public interest on its 
own: “experience demonstrates consumers are generally among the best 
vindicators of the public interest.” The “congressional mandate of 
public participation” is realized not through “writing letters to the 
Commission” or the like, but through intervention: that is, participation 
in the licensing process on terms comparable to the license applicant. 
In other words, the Court was supervising the administrative process to 
bring it more in line with the interest group pluralist conception. 
A series of judicial decisions also expanded public access to the judicial 
review of agency decisions, by lowering justiciability hurdles to the 
review of administrative action. Perhaps most notably, courts 
liberalized the legal standards for standing. In Association of Data 
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, the Supreme Court rejected 
the old “legal interest” test for standing to challenge agency action, 
opening the court doors to any party “arguably within the zone of 
interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question.”38 How do we know whether a party finds within 
the zone of interests? Justice Douglas’s answer is framed in the language 
of interest group pluralism. Even if statutes “do not in terms protect a 
                                                       
35 See also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2265-66 (2001) (characterizing these changes). 
36 Richard Stewart, The Reformation of Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1667 (1975). 
37 Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d 994 (1966). 
38 Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
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specified group,” it is easy to identify “those whose interests are directly 
affected” by litigation under those statutes.39 Other decisions in the 
same period liberalized ripeness standards, bringing courts into 
administrative controversies earlier.40 Cheering from the sidelines, 
many scholars encouraged these efforts, recasting litigation as an 
important form of public participation in agency decision making.41  
Perhaps the most consequential change to the administrative process in 
the 1960s and (especially) 1970s was the expanded use of notice-and-
comment rulemaking, whether as a matter of agency choice or 
congressional mandate.42 And the broader employment of notice-and-
comment procedures was justified, in part, as a way to expand 
participation in administrative decision making. If agency adjudication 
resembles a judicial proceeding, rulemaking is typically more legislative 
in character, both in form and substance. The agency solicits comments 
from “interested persons”43 and conducts public hearings before 
handing down a rule that is prospective in effect and “designed to 
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”44 Informal rulemaking 
expanded dramatically.45 In part, this reflected choices on the part of 
agencies to use informal rulemaking more, choices given blessing by the 
courts.46  
The expanded turn to informal rulemaking also reflected a deliberate 
design choice by Congress to vest agencies with rulemaking power as a 
principal policy tool. For instance, the landmark Clean Air Act of 1970 
gave EPA the power and responsibility to use rules to improve air 
                                                       
39 Id. at 157. 
40 Toilet Goods Assn., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967); Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967). 
41 See Schiller, supra note 26, at 1416. (describing scholarship that encouraged 
courts to “democratize” the administrative process by making it “genuinely 
participatory”). 
42 See CROLEY, supra note 1, at 102-03 (describing growth of rulemaking). 
43 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
44 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). Rules may also “describ[e] the organization, 
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.” Id. 
45 CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 10-16 (2010). 
46 See United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) 
(permitting an agency to dispense with the trial-type hearing required in 
formal rulemaking, notwithstanding statutory reference to a hearing 
requirement).  
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quality.47 The Congressional choice reflected, among other things, a 
sense that a wide-ranging policy process, open to environmental groups 
as well as affected industries, would yield fair policy outcomes. The 
legislative history for the statute showed a conscious choice to harness 
public participation both in standard setting, through the notice and 
comment process, and in enforcement, through the statute’s citizen-suit 
provision. In language that could have been borrowed from David 
Truman, the Act’s chief sponsor, Edmund Muskie, justified public 
participation in the creation of state-level enforcement plans on the 
grounds that the public could thereby “bring the most effective pressure 
to bear for clean air.”48  
3. Challenges to Pluralism  
Ultimately, however, efforts to make the administrative process more 
pluralist did not stem criticism of agency performance, which continued 
to lag.49 By the early 1960s, the new field of public choice scholarship 
offered a persuasive social science explanation for agency failure that 
directly challenged the premises of pluralism. Launched by such works 
as Buchanan and Tullock’s The Calculus of Consent,50 public choice sought 
                                                       
47 Clean Air Act Extension of 1970, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, (Dec. 31, 
1970). 
48 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR AMENDMENTS OF 1970, 
TOGETHER WITH A SECTION-BY-SECTION INDEX. 229, 230 (1974).  
49 For instance: a number of agencies that had been established with much 
fanfare came in for withering assessments by the end of the 1950s. Reports of 
chronic delays and arbitrary decision-making were common, and the quality of 
appointments received critical attention. See, e.g., Louis J. Hector, Problems of 
the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931, 931-32 
(1960); LANDIS, supra note 31, at 12-13 (1960). (In a memorable sign of the times, 
Landis suggested that one strategy to attract high-powered individuals to 
commissions would be to increase commissioners’ discretionary budget for 
parties and social activities.) Perhaps most damningly, a series of accounts 
pointed to the problem of regulatory capture: that agencies were serving the 
interests of regulated parties, rather than the public interest. See, e.g., 
BERNSTEIN, supra note 31; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE PROFESSOR AND THE 
COMMISSIONS 144-92 (1959); Huntington, supra note 31, at 472-504. And when 
a number of resigning federal commissioners penned memos to President 
Kennedy outlining serious problems in their agencies, it drove home the point 
that the commissions were struggling. See LOUIS M. KOHLMEIER, JR., THE 
REGULATORS 82 (1969). 
50 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 
(1962). See also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: 
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).  
 
 
 
 
 MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 17 
 
 
to apply the tools and concepts of economics to the operation of 
government and the production of public policy. Public choice analyses 
gave reasons to expect that agencies would predictably and 
systematically fail to translate interest group preferences into policies in 
an even-handed way.51 Crucially, this is so even if all interest groups in 
principle have equal access to the levers of regulatory policymaking, 
because their incentives to make use of them differ.52 Public choice 
scholarship has catalogued how bureaucratic structures multiply the 
possible sources of regulatory dysfunction.53  
Even the idea of that individual preferences could be rationally 
aggregated into a collective choice—a core premise of pluralist 
theory54—came in for challenge during the second half of the twentieth 
century. 55 Long ago, the Marquis de Condorcet had demonstrated that 
stable individual preferences over policy options can generate unstable 
and inconsistent collective choices, when individuals express their 
choices by voting.56 In 1951, Kenneth Arrow formalized and extended 
                                                       
51 Influential early works on the subject include: WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, 
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971), Richard A. 
Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 335 (1974); 
and George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. 3 (1971). For good overviews of the basic elements of public choice 
theory with an eye towards administrative law, see MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, 
& GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 10-29 
(1997); CROLEY, supra note 42, at 14-25. 
52 The incentives are strongest for regulated interests, which bear the costs of 
regulation most directly. The policies they pursue, by applying pressure either 
directly to agencies or to their congressional overseers, may lower social 
welfare as a whole, but members of the broader public will have little incentive 
to push for contrary policies, since the benefits to any individual are modest, 
the transaction costs to coordinating are high, and the possibility of free-riding 
on the efforts of others is a constant temptation. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE 
POLITICS OF REGULATION 357-94 (1980). 
53 Niskanen, for instance, explores how agencies can exploit the informational 
asymmetries relative to Congress (that is, the agencies have more information 
about their domains than does Congress) to maximize their budgets at the 
expense of the public interest. Niskanen, supra note 97, at 77. 
54 IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 2, 3 (2003). 
55 The challenge came from social choice theory, a field closely related to public 
choice theory. Social choice concerns the problem of collective decision 
making—that is, how to aggregate individual preferences over a set of policy 
options into a single (social) choice. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & ANNE 
JOSEPH O’CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW (2010). 
56 For a description, see MASHAW, supra note 51, at 12. 
 
 
 
 
18 MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
 
 
the “Condorcet Paradox.” Arrow’s “Impossibility Theorem” 
demonstrates that there is no principled, fair, and consistent vote 
aggregation technique that can reliably translate a diverse set of 
preferences into a policy choice.57 Arrow’s work showed that voting 
processes are subject to manipulation: he who sets the agenda in many 
cases controls the outcome. But more fundamentally, it showed that 
majoritarianism, which is so central to the appeal of voting, can be 
incoherent as a decision rule, depending on the preferences people hold 
over the available policy options. 
Some administrative lawyers have recognized the force of the public 
choice critique, but none have effectively taken it on board in thinking 
about administrative democracy. There is a well-developed body of work 
on agencies in the vein of positive political theory, which analyzes 
institutional behavior through formalized models, and this is heavily 
influenced by public choice insights.58 But the name is telling: positive 
political theory is indifferent to normative considerations. Richard 
Stewart recognized the force of what amounted to the public choice 
critique in his celebrated 1975 article.59 But ultimately that piece 
despairs of satisfactorily reconciling administrative practice to our 
democratic values.60  
B. Civic Republicanism 
 1. Civic Republican Theory 
In more recent years, many influential perspectives on administrative 
democracy have borrowed ideas from the civic republican tradition of 
political thought. If some pluralists reach back to Madison as an 
inspiration, civic republicans can call on an even older tradition, dating 
back as far as Aristotle61 and influential among the Framers.62 Rather 
than thinking of government as a matter of aggregating the pre-formed 
                                                       
57 For Arrow’s Theorem and its proof, see NOLAN M. MCCARTY & ADAM 
MEIROWITZ, POLITICAL GAME THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 68-72 (2007). 
On its implications, see ERIC MASKIN & AMARTYA SEN, THE ARROW 
IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM (2014). 
58 MASHAW, supra note 51, at 10-21. 
59 See Stewart, supra note 36, at 1683-85. 
60 Id. at 1813. 
61 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH 
OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 26 (1996). 
62 For an intellectual history of modern republican thought, see J.G.A. 
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (2003). 
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preferences of individuals or groups into policies, republicans offer a 
grander conception of the whole political enterprise. The political space 
is where individuals come together to forge and pursue a shared vision 
of the common good. The key to the process is constructive 
engagement among citizens or their representatives with one another, 
in the form of thorough, thoughtful deliberation and dialogue. Through 
public-minded engagement, republicans come to better understand not 
only their political opponents’ views, but their own as well, and to find 
common ground. This is a vision of politics that both promises more 
than pluralism, but it also requires more of citizens in the way of “civic 
virtues”: tolerance, patience, humility, good will, and discernment.  
While civic republicanism enjoys a long pedigree, its arrival on the scene 
as an influential position within modern political theory is fairly recent. 
Civic republicanism experienced newfound interest starting in the 
1980s and 1990s.63 Political science had changed since the heyday of 
pluralism, and contemplating the nature of democracy was no longer on 
the agenda for mainstream political scientists who study American 
politics.64 Rather, political theory was increasingly an autonomous 
subfield of its own,65 and a number of theorists in the 1980s and 1990s 
advanced sophisticated arguments in favor of a civic republican 
conception of democracy. In the view of many adherents, civic 
republicanism identified a critical failure of pluralist theory: its inability 
to account for the polity as a political community, to which its members 
were bound by ties of civic obligation. In the words of Michael Sandel 
in his influential 1996 book Democracy’s Discontents, “[t]he public 
philosophy by which we live cannot secure the liberty it promises, 
because it cannot inspire the sense of community and civic engagement 
that liberty requires.”66  
                                                       
63 Quentin Skinner’s The Idea of Negative Liberty, published in 1984, was in 
particular an important spur to the contemporary interest in civic republican 
ideas.  
64 GUNNELL, supra note 17, at 4. 
65 Id. at 245. 
66 SANDEL, supra note 61, at 6. Sandel identifies the reigning public philosophy 
of the contemporary United States as liberalism rather than pluralism. But 
Sandel’s liberalism shares with pluralism the core ideas that individuals come 
to the political process with their individuals already formed and that there is 
no supervening public good that government should be pursuing independent 
of those preferences. See also GUNNELL, supra note 17, at 242. (noting that ‘[b]y 
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There is substantial overlap between the perspective of some civic 
republicans and theorists of “deliberative democracy,” who began 
advancing their ideas around the same time, while marching under their 
own banner.67 Deliberative democracy theorists stress the legitimating 
force of the dialogic process through which individuals arrive at 
collective decisions.68 The arguments advanced by individual theorists 
differ in their particulars. In a series of influential works, philosopher 
Jürgen Habermas updated Kantian ethics to root the validity of norms 
in their capacity to meet with the agreement of all those affected 
following a “practical discourse” satisfying certain conditions.69 Amy 
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have offered an influential perspective 
geared more squarely to the political, and with a particular eye to 
American politics.70 In their 1996 book Democracy and Disagreement, they 
outlined how deliberation could lead to common ground even on hot-
button topics such as abortion.71 
2. In Administrative Law 
Some important features of the administrative process, as well as 
prominent perspectives for evaluating its performance, are best 
understood as reflecting civic republican or deliberative conceptions of 
democracy. The person most explicit about drawing these connections 
                                                       
the end of the 1960s, . . . pluralism and liberalism had largely become like 
Venus and the evening star.”). 
67See, e.g., JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW 
DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991); JOHN S. DRYZEK, 
DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
(1990); BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY 
NORMS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 
97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988). 
68 See Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí, Introduction, in DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS xiii, xv-xvi (Samantha Besson & José 
Luis Martí eds., 2006).  
69 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, I THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1984); 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, II THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1987); 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE 
ACTION (1991); JÜRGEN HABERMAS , JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION 
(1993). 
70 AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS F. THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISAGREEMENT (1996); AMY GUTMANN, WHY DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY (2004). For essays discussing Gutmann and Thompson’s work, 
see DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 
(Stephen Macedo ed., 1999).  
71 See GUTMANN &. THOMPSON, supra note 70, at 74-94. 
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has been Mark Seidenfeld, whose widely-read article A Civic Republican 
Justification for the Bureaucratic State appeared in 1992.72 Noting the rise 
of civic republican thinking among democratic theorists, Seidenfeld 
argues that legislative politics are not equal to the task of promoting 
constructive deliberation on the common good. “The structure and 
decisionmaking processes of Congress are not conducive to 
deliberation,” Seidenfeld asserts, noting that both the intensity of 
electoral pressures and the outsourcing of Congress’s work to 
committees as obstacles to authentic, broad-based deliberation.73 
Instead, Seidenfeld argues, the administrative process offers the best 
setting for realizing the civic republican ideal. More insulated from 
immediate political pressures than Congress, yet more in touch with 
policies and the public than the judiciary, agencies “may be the only 
institutions capable of fulfilling the civic republican ideal of deliberative 
decision making.”74 
The key to realizing that possibility is that agency decision-making 
processes must involve open deliberation, informed by participation of 
all relevant interests, over what policy choices serve the public interest. 
Seidenfeld sees in notice-and-comment rulemaking the potential for a 
truly deliberative process: “Comment procedures provide relatively easy 
access to the discourse among interest groups and the dialogue between 
those groups and decisionmakers.”75 
 But this potential will not be realized if the agency has already made up 
its mind before the rulemaking process begins. Seidenfeld argues that 
courts have, and have used, techniques to ensure that the notice-and-
comment process is genuinely deliberative, as opposed to mere window 
dressing. In his view, courts are right to require agencies to share the 
data on which they base their proposals and to go through notice-and-
comment again when they change positions, in the interests of 
promoting a real engagement between agency leaders and 
                                                       
72 Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992). 
73 Id. at 1544, 1544-46. 
74 Id. at 1541. 
75 Id. at 1560; see also id. (“In particular, the paradigmatic process for agency 
formulation of policy - informal rulemaking - is specifically geared to advance 
the requirements of civic republican theory.”). 
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stakeholders.76 He also argues that Congress should amend the APA to 
deter ex parte contacts, since private communications are at odds with 
the ideal of open dialogue.77 The executive branch has a role to play as 
well. Since the early 1980s, agencies have been required to submit cost-
benefit analyses of proposed rules to the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for approval.78 Seidenfeld suggests that a process for 
presidential review of rulemaking less squarely focused on cost-benefit 
analysis could require agency personnel to think more holistically about 
their overall missions and how individual rules serve it.79 
But Seidenfeld’s principal focus is on courts, and how judicial review can 
reinforce deliberative norms. Courts are in a unique position to promote 
democratic administration by insisting on the rational justifiability of 
agency decisions. Judicial review must test “whether the agency 
permitted open discourse, addressed all significant concerns reflected 
in the record, and generally provided a persuasive explanation of why its 
decision furthers the public interest.”80 To this end, Seidenfeld argues 
that courts should require agencies to make explicit how they 
understand the public interest in each policy context, and why their 
choice best serves that interest, whenever they exercise significant 
discretion.81  
In many respects, on-the-ground changes in administrative law over the 
past several decades resonate with civic republican ideals, as Seidenfeld 
acknowledged. The move to promote regulatory negotiation, dating 
from the 1980s, aims to make policymaking more genuinely deliberative, 
by bringing relevant stakeholders into agencies’ policy processes at an 
early stage.82 Also, the presidential rulemaking review process has 
changed along the lines that Seidenfeld proposed, at least to some 
degree. Executive orders from Presidents Clinton and Obama have 
broadened its scope outward from a pure cost-benefit analysis, 
                                                       
76 Id. at 1561. 
77 Id. at 1559. 
78 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981). 
79 Id. at 1552-53. 
80 Seidenfeld, supra note 72, at 1547.  
81 Id. at 1570. 
82 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (2012) (providing statutory authorization and 
procedures for regulatory negotiation).  
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promoting a more wide-ranging exchange between the White House 
and agencies on the merits of particular regulatory actions.83  
But probably the most important of these changes has been the 
adoption of “hard look” review and a stepped-up insistence on reasoned 
decision making more generally. The APA gives reviewing courts power 
to set aside agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an 
abuse of discretion.”84 Historically, arbitrary and capricious review was 
famously deferential,85 but starting at the end of the 1960s, the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals began using arbitrary and capricious review to 
demand that agencies comprehensively justify their policy choices.86 As 
Judge Leventhal explained in a 1970 case, a court has a duty to intervene 
“if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger 
signals, that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient 
problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-
making.”87 Endorsing hard look review in 1983, the Supreme Court 
detailed the obligation it imposed on the agency: 
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the 
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it 
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible 
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise.88  
Although courts insisted that hard look review was not unduly intensive, 
in fact it frequently placed a demanding burden of justification on the 
defendant.89 The coin of the realm in arbitrary and capricious review 
had become reasoned decision-making. As the D.C. Circuit explained 
in Greater Boston Television Corp.,  
                                                       
83 See Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993); Exec. Order No. 
13563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
84 5 U.S.C. § (2)(A) (2012). 
85 See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 US 190 (1943). 
86 See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of Courts, 122 
U. PA. L. REV. 509, 511-41 (1974) (describing different aspects of judicial review 
in recent environmental law cases). 
87 Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
88 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
89 See Jud Mathews, The Search for Proportionality in American Administrative 
Law, in THE JUDGE AND THE PROPORTIONATE USE OF DISCRETION (2015). 
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The process [of judicial review] thus combines judicial 
supervision with a salutary principle of judicial restraint, an 
awareness that agencies and courts together constitute a 
‘partnership’ in furtherance of the public interest, and are 
‘collaborative instrumentalities of justice.’ The court is in a real 
sense part of the total administrative process, and not a hostile 
stranger to the office of first instance. . . . Reasoned decision 
promotes results in the public interest by requiring the agency to 
focus on the values served by its decision, and hence releasing 
the clutch of unconscious preference and irrelevant prejudice. It 
furthers the broad public interest of enabling the public to 
repose confidence in the process as well as the judgments of its 
decision-makers.”90 
In other words, reasoned decision making is an acceptable surrogate for 
the normal forms of democratic legitimation, because it trains the 
agency’s focus on the contemplation of how its policy might best serve 
the public interest.91  
Much of the scholarship in a civic republican or deliberative vein focuses 
on the decision-making process within the agency as the site where 
interests and officials come together to hammer out policies in the 
public interest. Some scholars highlight that the back-and-forth 
between agency and reviewing court can be a “dialogue” with the 
potential to enhance the quality and legitimacy of government by 
agency. Seidenfeld himself noted that statutory judicial review of 
regulations, unlike constitutional review of legislation, can be an 
iterative process, in which the agency can respond to the court’s critique 
with new justifications.92  
Emily Hammond Meazell pushes the idea further, arguing that cases of 
“serial litigation” can amount to a court-agency dialogue, “a 
conversation in which the participants strive toward learning and 
                                                       
90 Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d 841, 851-852, (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
91 See also Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and 
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17 (2001); Glen 
Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative Law, 97 
IOWA L. REV. 849 (2012); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1286 (2009).  
92 See Seidenfeld, supra note 72, at 1547-48. 
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understanding to promote more effective deliberation and outcomes.”93 
On Meazell’s view, the exchanges between courts and agencies are 
legitimacy-enhancing, for reasons familiar to proponents of deliberative 
democracy: “when an agency clearly explains itself and how its actions 
relate to a previous court order [,] interested parties, Congress, and the 
courts can more easily understand and respond to their reasoning.”94 
3. Challenges to Civic Republicanism 
Civic republicanism and deliberative democracy remain very influential 
perspectives within contemporary political theory.95 At the same time, 
they have been the subject of forceful critiques in recent years. Some 
have argued that the civic republican conception of democracy bears no 
resemblance to how government operates in modern democracies, and 
so is unsuitable even to serve as an aspirational model. In the past few 
years, empirical studies and new work in cognitive psychology have also 
shed light on how deliberation and reason-giving actually function in 
group settings, and these have cast doubt on some civic republicans’ 
more ambitious claims.  
Some critics view the deliberative processes that these models place at 
the core of governance unrecognizable as an account of politics, even 
best-case-scenario politics. Certainly, as Friedrich Schauer and others 
observe with reference to Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, the 
deliberations they posit have little in common with the actual political 
dialogues that surround us.96 For some, the gap between our politics and 
the deliberative ideal is too vast for the theory even to serve as an 
model.97  
                                                       
93 Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1773 (2011). See also Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary 
Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1553 (2014) (discussing how some courts have used remands to engage in 
dialogue with agencies).  
94 See Meazell, supra note 93, at 1780. 
95 See, e.g., Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí, supra note 68, at xii (describing 
deliberative democracy as “one of the most fashionable ideas in contemporary 
Western political theory”). 
96 Frederick Schauer, Talking as a Decision Procedure, in DELIBERATIVE 
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 22 (Stephen 
Macedo ed., 1999). 
97 Moreover, as Schauer points out, the very features of our existing political 
discourse that diverge from the deliberative ideal—the manifold ways in which 
it falls short of reasonableness—are precisely what give rise to political 
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Also, in recent years, claims made by theorists about the role 
deliberation plays in politics have also been subjected to serious social 
scientific inquiry.98 Empiricists have begun taking note of deliberative 
theory, investigating how deliberation shapes outcomes, using 
qualitative case studies, natural experiments, and statistical methods.99 
Dennis Thompson, one of the most important figures to advance 
deliberative democratic theory in the United States, characterizes the 
empirical evidence in support of deliberative democracy theory as 
“mixed or inconclusive.”100 Some of the studies even show that real-
world deliberative processes tend to exacerbate, rather than reduce, 
power differentials between participants and lead to substantively worse 
decisions than non-deliberative processes.101  
Recent work in evolutionary psychology has also challenged the 
presuppositions of some deliberative theorists. The so-called 
argumentative theory of reasoning posits that reason evolved not to 
search for the truth, but to persuade others. Some logical flaws in one’s 
reasoning, such as an inability to recognize the weaknesses of one’s own 
position, may not be aberrations, but hard-wired features of human 
cognition.102 While it does not follow that deliberation cannot produce 
agreement or better outcomes, it suggests that its ability to do so 
depends heavily on context. Cognitive scientist Hugo Mercier has 
identified the failure of democratic debate in the United States as a 
                                                       
impasses. In a world where deliberation can work, deliberation won’t have 
work to do: “[i]n an ideal world, people would not have the kinds of belief that 
deliberation would talk them out of.” Id. At 24. 
98 See, e.g., John S. Dryzek, Theory, Evidence, and the Tasks of Deliberation, in 
DELIBERATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY: CAN THE PEOPLE 
GOVERN? 237 (Shawn W. Rosenberg ed., 2007). 
99 See STEPHEN ELSTUB & PETER MCLAVERTY, DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY: ISSUES AND CASES (2014); JÜRG STEINER, THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND NORMATIVE 
IMPLICATIONS (2012). 
100 Dennis F. Thompson, Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political 
Science, 11 ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 497, 499 (2008). Thompson argues that 
many of the studies are poorly formulated to test the core claims of 
deliberative democracy. 
101 See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH 
DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD 
WORK (2002). 
102 Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber, Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an 
Argumentative Theory, 34 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCI. 57 (2011); Hugo 
Mercier & Hélène Landemore, Reasoning is for Arguing: Understanding the 
Successes and Failures of Deliberation, 33 POLIT. PSYCH. 243 (2012). 
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function of the high-stakes, histrionic, adversarial nature of our 
contemporary politics.103 Taken together, the recent social scientific 
scholarship underlines how contingent it is for deliberation to lead to 
better outcomes that enjoy an enhanced sense of legitimacy.104  
C. Presidentialism 
1. Presidentialism in Theory 
Particularly if pluralism and civic republicanism seem to ask more from 
government than it can realistically deliver, a presidentialist conception 
of democracy may look like an appealing alternative. Presidentialists 
emphasize the privileged connection the President has to the people, as 
the sole governmental official who represents—and is electorally 
accountable to—the entire electorate. Since the 1980s, president-
focused approaches to thinking about democracy have been influential 
within administrative law.  
Legislatures, of course, are also elected. But presidentialists tend to take 
a dim view of legislative politics, as a sordid business of horse-trading 
that really only serves the interests of the well-connected. The 
President, by contrast, who has a distance from the backroom dealing 
of the legislature, comes into office with an electoral mandate to 
advance the People’s agenda. Presidential elections are plebiscites, in 
which the electorate chooses a leader based on his personal qualities and 
the political program that he offers. Relative to the legislature, the 
executive also has advantages in terms of effectiveness and 
responsiveness. Generally, then, it is democracy-enhancing to reduce 
obstacles to the President’s pursuit of his agenda.  
Political economists have argued that presidential government tends to 
produce results with majority support.105 But conceptions of democracy 
                                                       
103 Patricia Cohen, Reason Seen More as Weapon Than Path to Truth, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 14, 2011.  
104 See also Bächtiger et al., Deliberation in Legislatures: Antecedents and Outcomes, 
in DELIBERATION, PARTICIPATION, AND DEMOCRACY: CAN THE PEOPLE 
GOVERN? 82, 92-97 (Shawn W. Rosenberg ed., 2007) (identifying, through an 
empirical study of different legislatures, institutional and attitudinal 
preconditions for high-quality deliberation). 
105 See, e.g., ARENDT LIJPHART, THINKING ABOUT DEMOCRACY: POWER 
SHARING AND MAJORITY RULE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 151 (2008) (“My 
overall conclusion can be summarized in three words: presidentialism spells 
majoritarianism.”). See also Matthew Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53 (2008) (providing a positive political theory 
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that identify a single individual as the bearer of the democratic will find 
scant support within contemporary political theory. 106 In the words of 
political theorist Jeff Green, “plebiscitary democracy [] is almost 
universally considered a profanity by democratic theorists committed 
to an ethical understanding of political life.”107 Presidentialist 
conceptions of democracy typically rest, at least in part, on the 
plebiscitarian idea that a popular vote for a leader legitimates the actions 
he takes once in office. Political theorists tend to be wary of 
plebicitarians’ valorization of executive power, and consider it a short 
trip from plebiscitarianism to authoritarianism.108  
And in fact, the historical associations of plebiscitarianism should at 
least give pause to democrats attracted to presidentialism. Even the 
name assigned to the phenomenon of plebiscitary democracy by Max 
Weber—Führerdemokratie—could count for many as an argument against 
seriously entertaining the theory.109 The fact that plebiscitary 
democracy counted among its most enthusiastic advocates Carl 
Schmitt, the “crown jurist of the Third Reich,”110 compounds its image 
problem. But, as discussed further below,111 guilt by association is not 
the only reason why presidentialist conceptions of democracy have 
found little favor among contemporary theorists.  
2. As Applied to Administrative Law 
The fact that presidentialist ideas have not been embraced by 
contemporary political theorists has not kept them from having an 
impact. To be sure, even the most aggressive proponents of executive 
power in American government come nowhere close to 
                                                       
analysis of the relationship between presidential control and majoritarianism 
in practice).  
106 There is, on the other hand, a substantial body of positive scholarship on 
presidential politics, which emphasizes the unique institutional characteristics 
of the Presidency. See, e.g., STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS 
PRESIDENTS MAKE (1993).  
107 JEFFREY E. GREEN, THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE: DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE 
OF SPECTATORSHIP 120 (2010). 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 142. 
110 JOSEPH W. BENDERSKY, CARL SCHMITT, THEORIST FOR THE REICH 224-
25 (1983). 
111 See infra Subsection II.C.3. 
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authoritarianism.112 Still, there were important changes to 
administrative law starting in the 1980s that tended to amplify executive 
power,113 and the justifications for these changes tended to echo the 
presidentialist conception of the President as the People’s 
representative in government.  
The revival of conservative legal theory that began in the 1970s brought 
the concept of the unitary executive to renewed prominence by the 
1980s.114 Unitary executive arguments, which found vigorous champions 
within the Reagan and George W. Bush administrations, were mounted 
to oppose limitations on the President’s control over the executive 
branch.  
The unitary executive belonged to constitutional theory, not political 
theory: the claim was that an undivided executive power, with all lines 
of authority terminating in the President, was part of the original 
constitutional design.115 But the constitutional arguments were often 
bolstered with normative claims on behalf of the desirability of a unitary 
and strong executive. Steven Calabresi develops some of these 
arguments at length in an article specifically about the normative case 
for the unitary executive.116 In Calabresi’s view, a unitary executive is 
necessary to compensate for what he views as the manifest and 
unavoidable dysfunctions of legislative politics in the modern welfare 
state. Electoral incentives encourage wasteful spending that benefits 
individual districts over the commonweal, while the committee system 
gives members quasi-executive powers that those same electoral 
                                                       
112 As Jack Goldsmith shows in his account from his time as head of the Office 
of Legal Counsel, there were figures in the George W. Bush administration, 
notably David Addington, then legal counsel to Vice President Dick Cheney, 
who recognized very few limits on executive power. See JACK GOLDSMITH, 
THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 78-90 (2007); see also Dana Milbank, In Cheney’s Shadow, 
Counsel Pushes the Conservative Cause, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2004, at A21.  
113 See infra text accompanying notes 120-126. 
114 STEVEN MICHAEL TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL 
MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008); Stephen 
Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental 
Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2070-103 (2009). 
115 See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY 
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). 
116 Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 
ARK. L. REV. 23 (1995). 
 
 
 
 
30 MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
 
 
incentives encourage them to misuse.117 Only a President fully in control 
of the Executive Branch has the capacity to confront the “congressional 
redistributive collective action problem.”118 And it is pro-democratic for 
the President to do so, since he has the “national voice”: “he, and he 
alone, speaks for the entire American people.””119  
Not all arguments favoring expanded presidential power are rooted in 
the Constitution or advanced by conservatives. Elena Kagan justified 
the President’s aggressive use of the administrative process to advance a 
policy agenda in her influential article Presidential Administration, which 
draws particularly on the experiences of the Clinton presidency.120 
Kagan strongly endorses the process for the presidential review of 
agency rulemaking under the auspices of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB), as initiated by President Reagan and expanded under 
President Clinton.121 She also argued in support of President Clinton’s 
practice of issuing directives to agencies to take particular regulatory 
actions.122 Kagan’s argument was not that this degree of presidential 
control was constitutionally compelled, but rather that it was 
normatively desirable, because “presidential control of administration . 
. . possesses advantages over any alternative control device in advancing 
these core democratic values.”123 Kagan’s chief argument is a 
prospectively plebiscitarian one: a President has not only won a national 
election, but will face a second one, and to maintain favor with the 
national constituency will predictably choose policies that “reflect the 
preferences of the general public, rather than merely parochial 
interests.”124  
Lastly, a presidentialist conception of democracy has been used to justify 
the most written-about administrative law phenomenon of the last 
thirty-plus years: Chevron deference. In Chevron, USA Inc. v. National 
                                                       
117 Id. at 34-37; 50-55. 
118 Id. at 48. 
119 Id. 
120 Kagan, supra note 35. 
121 Id. at 2285-90.  
122 Kagan, supra note 35, at 2290-99. 
123 Id. at 2326, 2332. 
124 Id. at 2335. With reference to second-term presidents, Kagan has this to 
offer: “a President retains strong incentives to consider carefully the public’s 
views as to all manner of issues—incentives here related to his ambition for 
achievement, and beyond that for a chosen successor or historical legacy.” Id. 
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Resources Defense Council,125 the Supreme Court held that courts should 
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes that 
they administer. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens offered this 
rationale: 
In these cases, the Administrator’s interpretation represents a 
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests, 
and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical 
and complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and 
reasoned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling 
conflicting policies. Congress intended to accommodate both 
interests, but did not do so itself on the level of specificity 
presented by these cases. . . .  
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political 
interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy 
preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has 
delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of 
that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent 
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. 
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the 
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political 
branch of the Government to make such policy choices—
resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either 
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved 
by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in 
light of everyday realities.126 
Chevron was significant not least because it offered a new conception of 
what was at stake in statutory interpretation, one that implied new roles 
for legislature, court, and executive. Interpretive questions amount to 
policy choices, and the President should make the choice precisely 
because of his tight electoral connection to the American people.  
3. Challenges to Presidentialism  
 
The embrace of presidentialism within administrative law could be 
understood, in part, as a result of disillusionment with pluralist and civic 
republican models of democracy. Compared to these more ambitious 
                                                       
125 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 
837 (1984). 
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theories, presidentialism sets its sights lower—and in this respect, it 
resembles minimalism. The popular election of a President surely 
provides at least some legitimacy for the President’s acts. And the 
energy in the executive,127 at least in comparison with the sclerotic 
legislature, opens the possibility that more executive power means more 
responsive government.  
But if other theories promise too much, the problem with 
presidentialism is that it promises too little. Surely this is true of 
presidentialism in its strongly plebiscitary form. Such a view treats 
national elections, by themselves, as sufficient to legitimate the 
subsequent acts of the President. It follows, within this perspective, that 
the removal of obstacles to executive power is democracy-enhancing. A 
conception of democracy this thin offers no principled basis for a 
critique of autocratic government, so long as it features periodic 
elections.128  
There is a more moderate presidentialist view, that emphasizes how the 
electoral constraint tends to align presidential policies with majoritarian 
preferences.129 That may be true, but that constraint may not exhaust 
what we may legitimately expect from democracy. Standing for 
presidential elections may align the winning candidate’s platform, 
however loosely, with the wishes of the majority, at least on some major 
issues. But whatever force that argument has for the first term, it loses 
on the first day of the second term. And even well-functioning 
majoritarian processes can run roughshod over minority interests. 
Reducing democracy to presidential elections leaves us with no 
conceptual tools, for instance, for articulating why the protection of 
minorities is relevant to democracy.  
Presidentialism defines democratic commitments so far down as to very 
nearly throw in the towel and give up on democracy entirely. As 
described further below, minimalism offers a conception of democracy 
that is more demanding than presidentialism, but still more attainable 
than pluralism and civic republicanism.  
III. TOWARDS A MINIMALIST CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY 
                                                       
127 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
128 For more on the global phenomenon of “electoral authoritarianism,” see 
ANDREAS SCHEDLER, THE POLITICS OF UNCERTAINTY: SUSTAINING AND 
SUBVERTING ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM (2015).  
129 See, e.g., LIJPHART, supra note 105, at 151; Kagan, supra note 35, at 1226. 
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The previous Part outlines those stands of democratic theory that have 
been the most influential in the field of administrative law. The claim is 
not that judges or scholars have always consciously or explicitly drawn 
on political theory. Rather, I have argued that over the past half century, 
when administrative lawyers have had occasion to think about what 
democracy means, their answers have tended to line up with one or 
more of these families of theories. This alignment is not surprising, since 
(with the exception of presidentialism) these approaches to thinking 
about democracy have enjoyed broad currency among political scientists 
and political theorists within this period. 
But importantly, these approaches to thinking about democracy have 
also been subject to substantial criticism. Administrative law as a field 
has not yet come to terms with these critiques, even when actors in the 
administrative law system have recognized and tried to remedy gaps 
between theory and reality. For instance, as discussed above,130 the 
“reformation” of administrative law described by Richard Stewart was a 
response to the perceived failure of the administrative process to deliver 
on the promises of democratic pluralism. But the response itself was 
predicated on the pluralist premise that the fundamental precondition 
for democratic governance is establishing a level playing field for 
interest group politics. 
This Part outlines a minimalist conception of democracy capable of 
being applied to the administrative process, and built around the 
concept of non-domination—in essence, the idea that people should not 
be vulnerable in their basic interests to arbitrary or unfair exercises of 
power.131 This is a minimalist theory, in that it in that seeks to set a lower 
bar for what it means to be democratic than most traditional theories 
of democracy, while at the same time still capturing core democratic 
commitments. Others have propounded different minimalist 
conceptions of democracy that are not based on non-domination.132 In 
                                                       
130 See supra notes accompanying text 59-60. 
131 The concept is developed further below; see infra text accompanying notes 
148-158. 
132 Notably, Adam Przeworski has written about the minimum criteria 
electoral systems must meet to be properly considered democratic, building 
on scholarship from Robert Dahl. See ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY 
AND THE LIMITS OF SELF-GOVERNMENT (2010); ROBERT DAHL, 
POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION 1-3 (1971); Przeworski, supra 
note 8. Also, Richard Posner has endorsed what he calls “pragmatic” or 
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other words, one could reject the specific conception of democracy 
offered here and still accept the case for minimalism more generally. 
One advantage of a theory of democracy rooted in the concept of non-
domination is that it is not tethered to any particular set of institutions 
or practices. This makes it “portable,” in the sense that it can be applied 
in multiple contexts, including the administrative state.133 
One might fault the whole project of minimalist theory for being 
defeatist. Is there not something deflating about settling for minimally 
democratic administrative law? Would we not be better off aiming for a 
more demanding democratic ideal, even if in practice we were likely to 
fall short?  
There are two responses to this point. First, adopting minimalist theory 
may not involve settling at all. Minimalists would argue not that they 
offer a watered-down democratic theory, but a pure and vital one that 
zeroes in on the values right at the heart of our democratic impulses.  
The second point is that there are reasons to believe that the theory of 
second best may apply. 134 In certain contexts, aiming for an achievable 
second-best outcome leads to better results than pursuing an 
unobtainable first-best.135 Here, pursing of a demanding conception of 
democracy may lead to worse outcomes in the administrative contexts, 
by the lights of most observers, than aiming for a less demanding 
standard. A number of scholars have argued that the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process, with its judicially-enforced emphasis on 
participation and deliberation, amounts to a kind of Kabuki theater, in 
which agencies put on a show for the benefit of courts.136 Agency 
lawyers dutifully package regulations with the justifications that they 
                                                       
minimalism. RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 143-
57 (2009).  
133 Przeworski’s work, to illustrate the contrast, is specifically addressed to 
electoral institutions. 
134 See Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 
24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).  
135 Id.  
136 E. Donald Elliot, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1491, 1492 (1992)  
 (“Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as Japanese 
Kabuki theater is to human passions—a highly stylized process for displaying 
in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes place in other 
venues.”); see also Frank Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of 
Administrative Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1312 (1999) (making the same 
point). 
 
 
 
 
 MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 35 
 
 
believe will satisfy courts, which may have little to do with the agency’s 
real reasons for acting.137 And it is widely believed that demanding 
judicial review standards contribute to the ossification of the 
rulemaking process, generating delays and reducing agencies’ functional 
rulemaking capacity.138 Even persons who subscribe to a richer 
conception of democracy may conclude that taking minimalism as a 
lodestar for administrative practices yields better outcomes, if it means 
avoiding some of these pathologies.  
This Part locates the seeds for modern minimalism in the work of 
Joseph Schumpeter, and then outlines, in broad terms, a contemporary 
minimalist conception of democracy, drawing in particular on the work 
of political theorist Ian Shapiro.  
A. Schumpeterian Minimalism 
Joseph Schumpeter is widely regarded as the godfather of modern 
democratic minimalism.139 Though Schumpeter is best known for his 
work as an economist, his 1942 book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 
contained two chapters on democratic theory that proved to be widely 
influential.140 Schumpeter anticipated many of the modern critiques of 
what he termed the “classical doctrine of democracy.” Schumpeter 
argued that the touchstones of traditional democratic theory—the 
common good and the will of the people—were chimerical, and that our 
best efforts to aggregate individual preferences into policy are unlikely 
                                                       
137 Importantly, longstanding administrative law doctrine instructs courts to 
evaluate agency actions on the basis of the agency’s stated reasons, instead of 
“prob[ing] the mental processes” of agency decisionmakers. Morgan v. United 
States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938); see also United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 
(1941) (making same point); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery 
Corporation, 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (holding that agencies may not justify actions 
on post-hoc rationalizations). 
138 See supra note 13. The debate over ossification continues; for a recent 
empirical study and its critique, see Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb 
Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal 
Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950 – 1990, GEO WASH. L. REV. 144 (2012); and 
Richard Pierce, Rulemaking Ossification is Real: A Response to the Testing 
Ossification Thesis, The George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center, 
March 19, 2014, http://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/ rulemaking-
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139 JOHN MEDEARIS, JOSEPH SCHUMPETER’S TWO THEORIES OF 
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140 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
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to yield “what people really want.”141 He argued that citizens generally 
failed to take a sober and serious interest in the finer points of national 
political issues—and that it would be unreasonable to expect them to.142 
Schumpeter hammered political scientists of his day for offering 
panglossian theories of democracy that had nothing in common with 
political realities.143  
In contrast, Schumpeter offers a very different, and decidedly 
unromantic, understanding of what democracy at root is about. For 
Schumpeter, “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement 
for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power 
to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”144 
Entirely absent in this conception is any suggestion that “the people” 
are meaningfully engaged in a project of self-rule. The nearest thing 
democracy can offer in this direction is the disciplining force of a 
market—the market for votes—that incentivizes leaders to align policy 
choices with public preferences, at least broadly. The ever-present 
possibility of being voted out of office provides insurance against 
abusive or autocratic rule. A functioning democracy also necessarily 
provides a nimbus of freedoms that are preconditions for the 
competitive struggle for votes that Schumpeter describes.145  
B. Modern Democratic Minimalism 
Schumpeter’s theory of democracy had an “extraordinary impact,” 
influencing a diverse set of scholars,146 including several contemporary 
theorists. Schumpeter’s work is often regarded as conservative, whether 
owing to his low regard for the capacity of the average voter or from 
association with his staunchly capitalist economic theories. But 
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144 Id. at 269. 
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2.  
 
 
 
 
 MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 37 
 
 
importantly, contemporary work shows that there is nothing inherently 
conservative about democratic minimalism.147  
In addition to political scientists working with minimalist conceptions 
of democracy, there are a number contemporary political theorists who 
posits non-domination as a core political ideal. Ian Shapiro in particular 
has made the argument, in detail and at length, that non-domination is 
a democratic ideal, because it speaks to the most basic concerns of 
democratic theory. As mentioned above, a minimalist theory of 
democracy based on the concept of non-domination, as opposed to 
around specific electoral processes or institutions, recommends itself to 
the present project because it can be fairly readily applied to the 
administrative context.148 But it is by no means the only minimalist 
approach to democracy.  
For Schumpeter, the touchstone of democracy is competitive elections. 
But in what way exactly do competitive elections serve a democratic 
ideal, if voting does not unproblematically aggregate individual 
preferences or else express some general will? Shapiro offers an answer: 
Competitive elections prevent any one group from monopolizing power 
over the long term, and thereby dominating others. It is difficult to 
define exactly what collective self-rule entails, but far easier to identify 
what negates it: domination by others. And so for Shapiro, democracy 
is ultimately “a means of managing power relations so as to minimize 
domination.”149  
The problem of domination has received sustained attention from 
political theorists in recent decades.150 The concept of domination 
figures importantly in the work of Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, 
Michael Walzer, Quintin Skinner, and Phillip Petit, among others.151 
Theorists commonly understand domination to be a particular kind of 
                                                       
147 SHAPIRO, supra note 54, at 55.  
148 See supra text accompanying notes 132-133.  
149 SHAPIRO, supra note 54, at 3. 
150 Domination has also figured in scholarship on administrative law by Evan 
Criddle. See Evan Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of 
Administrative Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117 (2011). As the title to Criddle’s 
article suggests, and in contrast with the present approach, see infra Part IV, 
he views due process protections as the key to preventing administrative 
domination.  
151 See David Dyzenhaus, Response to Ian Shapiro’s On Non-Domination, 62 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 337 (2012); Ian Shapiro, On Non-Domination, 62 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 306-32 (2012). 
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unfreedom that results from abuses of power.152 In one formulation, 
domination is “subjection to the whims or arbitrary will of another.”153 
In the formulation favored by Shapiro, domination involves having one’s 
basic interests systematically disregarded in contexts where they should 
matter. Basic interests are the most fundamental ones: persons have 
basic interests “in the security, nutrition, health, and education needed 
to develop into, and live as, normal adults,” and in “developing the 
capacities needed to function effectively in the prevailing economic, 
technological, and institutional system, governed as a democracy over 
the course of their lives.”154  
If older democrats did not use the language of domination, it was 
nonetheless of concern to them. Madison famously argued for an 
extended republic in Federalist 10 precisely because in a large and 
diverse society, there is no “majority faction” with homogeneous 
interests that could run the table on politics, getting its way on every 
issue.155 In other words, the extended republic is a device to protect 
against domination.  
Because domination is a function of the power dynamics rather than the 
formalities of relationships, identifying it in practice always requires 
context-specific judgments. Shapiro writes that hierarchies, for 
instance, merit scrutiny for their potential to “atrophy into illicit 
systems of domination,”156 but they are not necessarily illegitimate: 
“There is a world of difference, for instance, between a teacher’s 
requiring a student to do her homework and his taking advantage of his 
powerful position to engage in sexual harassment of her. The latter is 
domination, but the former is not.”157 Ultimately, the aim of democratic 
government is “to enable people, as much as possible, to pursue the 
activities that give life its meaning and purpose while limiting the 
potential for domination that accompanies those activities.”158 
If non-domination is the touchstone of democratic legitimacy, Shapiro 
offers a number of off-the-shelf institutional strategies that can be 
                                                       
152 Shapiro, supra note 151, at 293. 
153 Dyzenhaus, supra note 151, at 340. Dyzenhaus here is characterizing the 
views of Phillip Pettit. 
154 Shapiro, supra note 151, at 294. 
155 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
156 Shapiro, supra note 151, at 338. 
157 SHAPIRO, supra note 54, at 4. 
158 Shapiro, supra note 151, at 338. 
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employed in different settings to bring decision-processes more in line 
with democratic norms. Perhaps the most basic is the principle of 
affected interests: “everyone affected by the operation of a particular 
domain of civil society should be presumed to have a say in its 
governance.”159 Context is key: what is essential is that the basic 
interests of persons are taken into account when decisions affect them, 
whatever the mechanism. Importantly, for Shapiro the right to have a 
stake in decision making is not premised on anything so grandiose as a 
belief that deliberation will produce consensus among stakeholders. 
Rather, it serves as a warrant against domination. Having one’s views 
taken into consideration in a decision-making process is incompatible 
with true domination.  
It bears emphasis that Shapiro presents non-domination as a democratic 
ideal, as opposed to, for instance, just an ideal of justice. Non-
domination, on this view, is something like the lowest common 
denominator of democratic theory, a value immanent in all reasonable 
conceptions of democracy. This minimalist approach to democracy 
recommends itself to the extent that the ambitions of conventional 
theories of democracy—to arrive at a common good or collective will by 
aggregating individual preferences or deliberating—are unattainable.160 
This conception of democracy is minimalist but not proceduralist, in 
that the principle of non-denomination provides a substantive yardstick 
to evaluate whether outcomes are truly democratic.  
This conception of democracy, like most political theory constructs, is 
pitched at a high level of generality. By itself, the theory has limited 
resolving power, as its key operative terms are fairly open-ended. 
Deciding actual cases will require making choices, including choices 
about what counts as basic interests and domination. The next Part 
illustrates one set of possibilities for how this approach to thinking 
about democracy could inform how courts carry out judicial review.  
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159 IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 37 (1999). 
160 Arguing that proponents of aggregation and deliberation alike 
“overestimate the importance of the idea of the common good for democracy,” 
Shapiro offers a “stripped-down” view of the common good, as “that which 
those with an interest in avoiding domination share.” Shapiro, supra note 54, 
at 3. 
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A. Defining the Task 
The aim of this Part is to consider democratic minimalism as a 
normative yardstick for administrative law, and specifically, for the 
judicial review of agencies by courts.161 This Part does not offer a 
wholesale reimagining of the field of administrative law from the 
minimalist perspective, which is well beyond the scope of a single law 
review article. The focus here is deliberately restricted to the judicial 
review of agency actions, and further, to a few key topics within judicial 
review.  
The arguments made in this Part are best understood as answers to the 
question: from the perspective of democratic minimalism, how can 
judicial review best enhance the democratic legitimacy of agency action? 
There are two points that need to be made at the outset about this way 
of framing the question. 
First, the democratic mode of legitimation is not the only one available 
for uses of public power. For instance, judicial decisions are generally 
considered legitimate not because judges are elected,162 but because of 
the impartiality of judges and the procedural fairness of trials.163 In 
administrative law, agency adjudication is structured as a quasi-judicial 
proceeding, with APA provisions guaranteeing an impartial decision 
maker164 and procedural fairness.165 In highly technical contexts, subject-
                                                       
161 This Part represents my own application of the minimalist conception of 
democracy elaborated in the previous Part: I am not attempting here to 
channel or speak for any of the theorists of non-domination mentioned in that 
Part. Ian Shapiro has written about what his theory implies for judicial review, 
but not in the administrative law context. See SHAPIRO, supra note 54, at 64-
77.  
162 David Pozen does explore the idea that state judicial elections are a 
manifestation of popular constitutionalism in a 2010 article. David E. Pozen, 
Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 (2010).  
163 On the traditional understanding, the judicial process did not need to be 
democratic because it does not involve making law, but applying law. Even 
admitting that a sharp distinction between making and applying law cannot be 
maintained, it is still possible to argue, as the legal process scholars did, that 
judicial lawmaking is different from legislating, and is legitimate so long as 
courts play their proper role of resolving disputes through the judicial method.  
See William N. Eskridge Jr & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1993).  
164 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012). 
165 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012) (barring ex parte 
contacts with the agency adjudicator and separating investigatory and 
prosecutorial functions).  
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specific expertise may properly play a legitimating role in agency 
decision making.166  
It is in areas where agencies make significant policy choices—where 
they are performing a role similar to the legislature’s—that the need for 
democratic legitimation is highest. Agencies typically make these 
choices in the context of rulemakings, and accordingly, the discussion 
below focuses mostly on judicial review of rulemaking.167 But of course, 
even in the context of agency policy choices, judicial review does not 
only exist to ensure that administrative actions are democratically 
legitimate. most important rationale judicial review exists for the sole 
purpose of. Judicial review serves a number of other ends as well, such 
as vindicating individual legal entitlements, and Congress has often 
crafted agency-specific judicial review provisions for context-specific 
reasons.168 While the discussion below focuses to judicial review’s 
capacity to reduce domination, in a bigger picture perspective, this is 
one function to be balanced against others. 
Second, to ask how judges can enhance the democratic legitimacy of the 
administrative process arguably treats courts as standing outside of the 
system of government and the pull of politics altogether. It is standard 
operating procedure for legal scholarship to instruct courts in how they 
should do their work, but doing so implicitly extends to judges more 
benefit of the doubt than other officials typically receive. A prescription 
aimed at courts will only be effective to the extent that judges perform 
                                                       
166 Expertise was perhaps the leading rationale for delegations to agencies 
during the first two generations of the modern administrative state. See, e.g., 
JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 22-28 (1938). 
167 Because agencies are permitted to make policy also through adjudications, 
see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947), the focus is not 
exclusively on review of rulemakings.  
I also focus here on substantive review by courts, as provided for in 5 U.S.C. § 
706(2)(A) (2012). Courts’ construction of the rulemaking requirements of 5 
U.S.C. § 553 (2012) also have been shaped by an effort to make the rulemaking 
process more deliberative and participatory, for instance, by requiring agencies 
to make relevant documents available to interested parties, see Portland 
Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and to respond to 
significant comments, see Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 
F.3d 715 (D.C. Cir. 1997). A minimalist conception of democracy has 
implications for these practices as well, but the focus here is on the conduct 
of substantive judicial review. 
168 See, e.g., Melissa F. Wasserman, Deference Asymmetries: Distortions in the 
Evolution of Regulatory Law, 93 TEX. L. REV. 625 (2015) (discussing different 
judicial review arrangements for patent grants and patent denials). 
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in good faith, unswayed by strategic or political considerations of their 
own. But the idea that courts can be trusted is more often assumed than 
argued for.  
This is a fair criticism to level at most work that looks to courts to 
ameliorate the political dysfunctions of other institutions, including this 
piece. But while accepting the criticism, I argue that applies here in 
slightly attenuated form. Precisely because minimalism prescribes a 
baseline norm of low-intensity review (as described further below), it 
expects less of courts, and leaves less scope for judicial self-dealing, than 
theories that authorize courts to engage in more searching, wide-
ranging review.169  
B. The Basic Framework 
I argue from the premises of democratic minimalism for a general 
framework for judicial review that combines a baseline norm of low-
intensity, reasonableness review with the possibility of elevated scrutiny 
when agency actions threaten serious harms to persons’ basic interests. 
First, I lay out the basics of the framework, and then I apply it to some 
specific aspects of judicial review, making reference to previous cases to 
illustrate my points.  
1. A Return to Reasonableness 
The pluralist and civic republican conceptions of democracy call for 
vigorous judicial review. This is so because they set a high bar for what 
counts as democratically legitimate administrative actions. Agencies’ 
processes must be solicitous of all of the groups with an interest in the 
action in question, and on equal terms. Agencies must give a hard look 
to all of the arguments proffered by the various stakeholders, and 
explain in detail why the chosen course of action is justified in light of 
them. Reviewing courts, in turn, must apply ample scrutiny to the 
agency’s action to verify that the agency has cleared the bar.  
From a minimalist perspective, the pluralist and civic republican 
conceptions of democracy demand more than is realistic from agencies. 
Accordingly, agencies will consistently fail to clear the bar the bar that 
they set, which means that reviewing courts applying these standards 
                                                       
169 One issue that is not a particular problem for democratic minimalism is the 
concern that decision-making by unelected judges is inherently anti-
democratic, since, on this view of democracy, the touchstone of legitimacy is 
the protection of people’s basic interests, rather than electoral accountability.  
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will constantly be setting aside agency action. But there is no reason to 
suppose that frequent judicial invalidations will systematically make 
agency outcomes more meaningfully democratic. The predictable 
consequence of having courts require agencies to meet unrealistic 
standards of inclusion and rationality is, instead, the ossification of 
agency processes. 
As a general matter, then, minimalism counsels in favor of restraint 
when it comes to the judicial review of agencies. A reviewing court is 
not looking for a perfect weighing of the different interests at stake, or 
a comprehensively rational justification of the agency’s action. Instead, 
a court is looking to see that no one is being systematically disregarded 
or arbitrarily harmed in decisions that adversely affect his or her basic 
interests. Below, I discuss what should trigger additional scrutiny, and 
what form that scrutiny should take. The default position, however, 
should be a basic reasonableness review.  
As Justice Frankfurter put it, judicial standards of review can really only 
express a mood,170 and “reasonableness” can convey varying degrees of 
laxity.171 At the limit, reasonableness review can entail hardly any review 
at all, as in the British Wednesbury standard,172 which will only flunk an 
agency decision “so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral 
standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the 
question to be decided could have arrived at it.”173 “Rational basis with 
bite” is nearer the mark: more intensive than Wednesbury, but less 
intensive than full hard look.174 I discuss further what kinds of agency 
justifications survive reasonableness review below.175  
2. Varying the Intensity of Review 
                                                       
170 Universal Camera Corp. v. Labor Board, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951). 
171 For a discussion of some of the different possibilities, see Giancinto della 
Cananea, Reasonableness in Administrative Law, in REASONABLENESS AND LAW 
295 (Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor & Chiara Valentini eds., 2009). 
172 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corp. [1948] 1 KB 223. 
173 Council of Civ. Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civ. Serv. [1985] AC 374, 
410.  
174 See Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 
WASH. L. REV. 419, 470-71 (2009). Keller describes the majority’s approach in 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009), as an example of 
“rational basis with bite” review. 
175 See infra Part IV.D. 
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It has been argued that the existing standards of judicial review already 
amount to a single reasonableness requirement.176 In fact, though, the 
evidence suggests that there is substantial variability in how intensively 
review is carried out in practice. Significantly, doctrine seems to provide 
less guidance as to how the intensity of review varies than one might 
hope: courts do not agree, for instance, on whether substantial evidence 
review is more stringent than, less stringent than, or equivalent in 
stringency to arbitrary and capricious review. 177 At the same time, there 
appear to be variations in the intensity of review actually applied by 
courts that are wholly unconnected to doctrine. For instance, certain 
agencies appear to routinely receive more deference from courts than 
others.178 There are some areas of doctrine that address how the 
intensity of review varies: for instance, with respect to agency statutory 
interpretations, Chevron review is more deferential than Skidmore 
review,179 and the intensity of Skidmore review varies depending on 
features of the agency’s interpretation. But these are the exception 
rather than the rule: for the most part, the law is unclear on how the 
intensity of review should vary across contexts. 
Minimalism offers a useful guiding principle with respect to the basic 
question of how the intensity of judicial review should vary. If 
democracy at root is about non-domination, then judicial review is 
democracy-enhancing when it is deployed to detect and correct 
situations where parties’ basic interests are unjustifiably disregarded 
with results that cause them serious harm. Reasonableness review is 
appropriate as a baseline norm, but harms to the basic interests of 
affected parties can trigger a higher duty of justification.  
To be more specific, courts should depart from the norm of relaxed 
review when a party plausibly claims that an agency inappropriately 
disregarded its legitimate interests, or otherwise acted so arbitrarily as 
to constitute an abuse of power, resulting in serious harm to the party. 
Under these circumstances, hard look review and associated doctrines—
the requirement that agencies respond to all significant comments;180 
the requirement that agencies make available the data that support their 
                                                       
176 See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 2317 (2010). 
177 Different courts have given all three answers. See Mathews, supra note 89.  
178 See Kathryn Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 
INDIANA L.J. 1207 (2015).  
179 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
180 United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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action181—should apply with full effect. The court should ask: Did the 
agency give an adequate, contemporaneous response to the arguments 
made by the claimant? Has the agency demonstrated that it considered 
alternatives that are less burdensome to the adversely affected? Has it 
given adequate reasons for choosing the policy it selected over those 
alternatives? Ordinarily, the focus of the inquiry should be on whether 
the agency adequately took into account the interests of those affected 
by its decision.  But an agency’s disregard of other relevant, important 
factors and other blatant errors could also be grounds for setting aside 
its decision, since truly arbitrary uses of power that cause potent harms 
can also amount to domination.182  
This framework for review is broadly similar in spirit to proposals some 
scholars have made to peg the intensity of review to the openness of the 
agency’s process to interest group input.183 It also resonates with 
doctrines governing intensity of review in some other administrative law 
systems. For instance, a general principle of European Union Law is 
proportionality: the benefits from measures must justify the burdens 
                                                       
181 Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
182 See supra text accompanying note 153. Statutes typically specify the factors 
that agencies should consider in making policy choices, and in some cases, 
statutes bar agencies from taking into account important interests of affected 
groups. For instance, under the Clean Air Act, EPA is instructed to set 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) at the level “requisite to 
protect public health” and “public welfare”, without reference to compliance 
costs. See 42 U.S.C. §7409(b)(1)-(2) (2012); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 
Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). Although lower levels will predictably result in more 
job losses, Congress has made a choice that the agency should make its choice 
on the basis of health considerations, to the exclusion of economic 
considerations. In circumstances such as this, the impact of the agency’s action 
on the economic interests of those affected may trigger heightened scrutiny, 
but the agency defends its action by showing that it adequately considered a 
different set of factors. 
183 See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information 
Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2010); David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative 
Procedure Act: Democracy Index Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (2005). A 
difference between these proposals and the one presented in this Article is 
that the former are more focused on process, or inputs—was the agency’s 
rulemaking sufficiently participatory?—and the latter is oriented more 
towards substance, or outputs. While opportunities for interested parties to 
participate in agency policy-making processes, for instance, by commenting on 
rulemaking proceedings, are appropriate, what is critical, from the minimalist 
perspective outlined here, is that the agency gives appropriate weight to the 
relevant interests.  
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they impose on adversely affected parties.184 Proportionality review can 
be conducted with greater or lesser deference to the judgments of 
policymakers. And proportionality applies less deferentially the more 
that especially important interests—those protected by rights—are 
implicated.185 In other words, the more a decision affects basic interests, 
the more intensively the court will scrutinize the government’s 
justification for it. 
To make matters more concrete, I offer four cases help to demonstrate 
how the framework could apply, and to illustrate where it would both 
overlap with and differ from current practices. The analysis in all cases 
reflects a series of contestable judgments: about what kind of harms 
should trigger heightened scrutiny; about what different levels of 
scrutiny mean in practice; and to what extent the decisions under 
consideration aligned with the framework considered here. For these 
reasons, the discussion shows what minimally democratic judicial review 
could look like in practice, rather than what it must look like.   
Two cases (FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.186 and Motor Vehicles 
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Insurance187) are offered to show, 
respectively, how courts should and should not review run-of-the-mill 
agency policy choices. The other two cases (Judulang v. Holder188 and 
Industrial Union Dep’t, ALF-CIO v. Hodgson189) are offered to show, 
respectively, how courts should and should not conduct review when 
agency action threatens serious harm to parties’ basic interests.  
Fox Television Stations concerned a challenge to a change in FCC policy 
regarding the broadcast of “fleeting expletives”: non-repetitive, non-
literal uses of vulgar language. After fielding numerous complaints 
following a series of live award show broadcasts in which celebrities 
indulged in salty language,190 the agency eliminated a safe harbor that 
                                                       
184 See TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 136-231 
(2006). 
185 See PAUL CRAIG, GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 544-51 (2011); Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of 
Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 174 (2006).  
186 Fed. Commc’n, et al. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
187 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
188 Judulang v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 476 (2011). 
189 Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 
1974). 
190 See Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 508-10 (describing the incidents). 
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had previously shielded fleeting expletives from liability under the 
indecency standards.191 Broadcasters challenged the action as arbitrary 
and capricious and won below, but lost before the Supreme Court. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected the suggestion that the 
reasons for the agency’s new approach to fleeting expletives needed to 
be better than the reasons for its past policy: “it suffices that the new 
policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for 
it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious 
change of course adequately indicates.”192 The reasons the agency gave 
for expanding the scope of enforcement—that literal and nonliteral uses 
of offensive words were equally indecent; that isolated utterances could 
be harmful to children and lead to more uses of offensive language—
were “entirely rational.”193 The Court’s majority also disagreed with the 
dissenting justices’ conclusion that the agency was insufficiently 
attentive to the First Amendment implications of its policy.194 
The Supreme Court applied only moderate scrutiny to the FCC’s order. 
The Court required reasons for the agency’s action, but not a 
demonstration that this action was better than the alternatives. Nor did 
the Court require as exacting an analysis of the order’s collateral impacts 
as the dissent would have demanded. From the perspective of 
democratic minimalism, nothing more was required to ensure that the 
agency’s action was legitimate. The interests at stake were important; in 
litigation, they almost always are.195 But the FCC’s action did not pose 
a serious threat to anyone’s basic interests.196 Insofar as judicial review 
in a democratic state should be aimed at protecting persons against 
domination by agency power, the kind of reasonableness review that the 
majority provided was sufficient.  
In State Farm, the Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to rescind a passive 
restraint requirement for new cars. The agency had explained that, 
contrary to its initial projections, most auto manufacturers would meet 
the requirement through the use of detachable automatic seatbelts, and 
                                                       
191 The agency made the policy change in an order. See id. at 509-10. 
192 Id. at 515. 
193 Id. at 517. 
194 Id. at 526-27. 
195 Here, the interests included the potential for substantial monetary fines 
levied against broadcasters, and a potential chilling effect on protected speech.  
196 See supra text accompanying note 159 (describing basic interests).  
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that these seatbelts would have a limited impact on safety, since many 
users would disconnect them.197  
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, put the 
agency’s arguments through the wringer. What were the agency’s 
reasons for rescinding the rule entirely, instead of adopting an airbags-
only requirement?198 Also, studies showed most people used safety belts 
some of the time. Might this mean that people who disconnected 
automatic seatbelts would later reconnect them, and then leave them 
attached?199 And why was the agency so quick to reject continuous 
passive belts? The Court was unconvinced by the agency’s arguments 
that these were unpopular with the public and less safe than other 
options.200  
State Farm is famous as the Supreme Court’s foray into “hard look” 
arbitrary and capricious view, in the form pioneered by the D.C. 
Circuit.201 But from the minimalist perspective, the State Farm majority’s 
approach looks like overkill, given the nature of the dispute. It is 
arguably a close question, but I would argue that NHTSA’s rule 
rescission did not pose a serious threat to persons’ basic interests.202 
Nonetheless, the Court insisted on a maximally comprehensive 
justification for the agency’s choice, requiring in effect that the agency 
demonstrate the superiority of its choices over alternatives. This kind 
of strict insistence on comprehensive justifications makes sense if the 
touchstone of administrative legitimacy is the comprehensiveness of its 
deliberations. But for democratic minimalists, the reason-giving 
requirement has the more modest goal of ensuring that the agency has 
not irrationally or maliciously caused serious harm to persons’ basic 
interests. Accordingly, a lesser measure of scrutiny would be 
appropriate. 
                                                       
197 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 38-39. 
198 Id. at 48. 
199 Id. at 53-54. 
200 Id. at 54-56.  
201 Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and 
the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 863-70 (1988). 
202 NHTSA had previously mandated seatbelts, so the agency’s action had not 
left motorists without life-saving safety features in their cars. See Initial Motor 
Vehicle Safety Standards, 32 Fed. Reg. 2408, 2415 (Feb. 3, 1967) (to be codified 
at 23 C.F.R. pt. 255). As a result, the agency’s action here did not leave drivers 
to face unreasonable risks to life with no means of protecting themselves.  
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Judulang concerned a challenge to a policy of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA) regarding eligibility to apply for a form of discretionary 
relief from deportation. Prior to 1996 revisions to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA), aliens who sought entry to the United States but 
faced exclusion—generally on the grounds that they had committed 
criminal offenses specified in the statute, could seek discretionary relief 
from exclusion.203 Executive action and judicial decisions had extended 
the eligibility to apply for relief to aliens facing deportation, but the BIA 
had to determine which aliens in deportation proceedings were eligible. 
Under the “comparable grounds” approach, aliens could apply for relief 
if the ground for their deportation was comparable to a ground for 
exclusion listed in the INA. An alien who was denied the opportunity 
for relief challenged the policy as arbitrary and capricious. In an opinion 
written by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court agreed. The Court 
concluded that the criterion that the agency used to determine 
eligibility was “irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to reside in this country” 
and was therefore not a reasoned exercise of discretion.204 
From a democratic minimalism perspective, the Judulang decision gets 
it right. The context—setting the criteria governing eligibility for relief 
from deportation—is one in which persons’ basic interests are at stake. 
In such a context, it is appropriate for a court to demand a showing that 
the agency’s decision has adequately taken account of the interests at 
stake. The Court in Judulang insists it is applying only requiring that the 
agency’s decision be rational, and that it cannot “discern a reason for 
it”.205 In fact, the agency gives three reasons for its policy, relating to 
text, history, and cost;206 the Court has really concluded that the 
agency’s reasons are not good enough. And given the stakes for the 
people affected by the agency’s action, the Court is right to insist on a 
high standard of reasoned decisionmaking here. 
That insistence was lacking, at least in part, from the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in the Hodgson case. The case concerned a challenge to an 
asbestos standard promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA). Petitioners, the union representing workers 
exposed to asbestos in their workplaces, challenged a number of aspects 
of OSHA’s “two fiber” standard, including a four-year delay before its 
                                                       
203 Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 187, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994). 
204 Judulang, 132 S.Ct. at 484. 
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implementation. The petitioners argued that the implementation lag 
posed a health hazard for workers. The Court had this to say on the 
subject: 
We cannot say, on the basis of the conflicting testimony in the 
record, that the Secretary erred in his prediction of the health 
effect of the four year delay, but neither can we say that 
employees are not exposed to some additional risk of disease 
because of greater exposure. In view of the Act’s express 
allowance for problems of feasibility, the Secretary’s decision to 
allow a four year delay is not irrational with regard to those 
industries that require that long to meet the standard. It is 
appropriate to allow sufficient time to permit an orderly 
industry-wide transition since, in those cases, the indeterminate 
degree of risk involved is counterbalanced by considerations of 
feasibility; it is not, however, a risk to which employees should 
be needlessly exposed.207 
This is an issue that implicates workers’ basic interests in life and health. 
Given the stakes, the Court should demand better reasons for delaying 
the standard than that implementation may involve “problems of 
feasibility” and that allowing the delay is “not irrational.”208 In the 
Court’s defense, it may be that the judges gave scant attention to this 
particular issue because they found the delay unsupported on other 
grounds.209  
 
C. What Kinds of Reasons Must Agencies Give?  
We can get a sense for what reasonableness review means by reflecting 
on an ongoing debate about what kinds of reasons are admissible to 
justify agency actions.  
The reason-giving requirement is foundational to modern 
administrative law.210 But what kinds of reasons must agencies give for 
their actions to pass judicial muster? Courts have sometimes set a very 
high bar indeed for what counts as an adequate justification for an 
agency action. The Supreme Court’s landmark State Farm case, discussed 
above, illustrates the point. As a practical matter, the majority 
                                                       
207 Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO, 499 F.2d 467, 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
208 Id.  
209 Id. at 480. 
210 See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 91. 
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demanded that the agency demonstrate why its policy was superior to 
possible alternatives that the agency could have adopted.  
Dissenting in State Farm, Justice Rehnquist believed that the reason for 
the agency’s change of course on passive restraints was obvious and 
adequate: 
The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to 
the election of a new President of a different political party. It is 
readily apparent that the responsible members of one 
administration may consider public resistance and uncertainties 
to be more important than do their counterparts in a previous 
administration. A change in administration brought about by the 
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an 
executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its 
programs and regulations. As long as the agency remains within 
the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess 
administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the 
philosophy of the administration.211 
Drawing in part on Justice Rehnquist’s State Farm dissent, Kathryn 
Watts has developed the argument that—within carefully specified 
limits—courts should be receptive to agency justifications of their 
choices that make reference to political factors.212 For instance, where 
both Options A and B are permissible under the statute, the agency 
should be allowed to explain that it chose Option A because it better 
aligns with the President’s agenda.213  
Watt’s argument has been controversial, with some scholars arguing that 
letting politics in to judicial review erodes the legitimacy of the 
administrative process.214 But from the perspective of democratic 
minimalism, there is nothing wrong with justifying administrative 
                                                       
211 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
212 Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009). For the details of her proposal, see id. at 45-73. 
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214 See, e.g., Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: 
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decisions with reference to legitimate political considerations.215 
Minimalism offers a less demanding conception of democracy than 
most of its competitors, and a less demanding set of legitimacy 
conditions translates into a larger set of reasons for agency action that 
count as legitimate. Within this perspective, a political explanation for 
an otherwise reasonable policy choice is good enough. If political 
influences on agencies’ decisions are not democratically disqualifying, 
and to a minimalist they are not, then there is no reason to prohibit 
agencies from acknowledging them. Among other benefits, permitting 
agencies to acknowledge political influences could help put an end to 
the tiresome charade in which agencies pretend that the reasons they 
state publicly are the reasons for their actions, and the courts pretend 
to believe them.  
D. Chevron Revisited  
This simple framework for judicial review can be integrated with 
doctrinal structures designed for particular contexts within 
administrative law, such as the judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretations. In administrative law, debate over how courts should 
review agency interpretations of statutes revolves around discussions of 
Chevron deference: what exactly it entails, and when it should apply. This 
section brings the minimalist framework to bear on how and when 
Chevron should operate.  
Famously, the 1984 case Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,216 defines a two-step inquiry for reviewing courts when 
evaluating agency constructions of statutes that they administer. First, 
the court asks whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise 
question at issue in the statute. If the answer is yes, then Congress’s 
intent, as expressed in the statute, controls. If the answer is no—that is, 
if the statute is ambiguous with respect to the question—then the court 
is to uphold the agency’s construction so long as it is reasonable. 
Chevron, like minimalism itself, is a doctrine of “good enough.” An 
agency’s interpretation of a statute doesn’t have to be the best 
interpretation from the reviewing court’s perspective: it will be upheld 
so long as it is reasonable. Chevron also shares with democratic 
                                                       
215 As Watts discusses, some political reasons—for instance, naked preferences 
for one group over another—would certainly not be adequate justifications for 
agency choices. Watts, supra note 212, at 52. 
216 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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minimalism a certain political realism, at least when compared with its 
competitors. Chevron receives the attention it does in part because of 
its unprecedented, candid acknowledgment that questions of statutory 
interpretation, far from being merely matter of legal technique, really 
are stalking horses for political choices. If the gaps in statutes really are 
opportunities to make policy choices, Chevron argued, they are better 
made by executive branch officials than courts.  
One of the questions arising under Chevron concerns the nature of the 
review courts are to conduct at Step Two. A number of scholars have 
argued that Step Two review amounts to, or should amount to, the same 
thing as the arbitrary and capricious review that courts apply to 
exercises of agency discretion,217 and the Supreme Court has suggested 
that it agrees.218 From a minimalist perspective, I would agree that these 
standards should be the same, and more specifically, that they should be 
the standard described above: a baseline reasonableness review, with 
elevated scrutiny when it appears the agency’s inadequate attention to 
relevant basic interests caused serious harms. This has the nice feature 
of harmonizing well with the language of Chevron, which instructs 
courts to allow reasonable constructions of ambiguous statutes.  
From a minimalist perspective, Chevron is a sensible doctrine. Step One 
is a threshold inquiry establishing that the agency in fact has some 
discretion within the statute at issue, and then Step Two assures that 
the agency uses its discretion in a reasonable way. As a whole, Chevron 
leaves agencies ample room to choose a course of action while working 
as a check against domination. 
In recent years, however, the fate of Chevron has become unclear. A 
number of decisions have established carve-outs from Chevron review, 
prescribing higher scrutiny instead,219 although some cases have pushed 
in the other direction.220 To take a very high-profile recent example, in 
King v. Burwell, Chief Justice Roberts rejected out of hand the 
suggestion that Chevron deference was owed to the Treasury 
Department’s interpretation of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
                                                       
217 See, e.g., 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, 
at 453 (2002); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1280-86 (1997).  
218 Judulang, 132 U.S. 476 (2011).  
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Care Act.221 On occasion, the Court has nominally applied Chevron, but 
in anything but a spirit of deference.222 Moreover, empirical work 
indicates that the Supreme Court routinely declines to apply Chevron 
without comment in circumstances that, according to the Court’s own 
doctrine, Chevron should apply.223 In lieu of Chevron, courts typically 
review agencies’ interpretations of statutes within less deferential 
frameworks, such as the sliding-scale Skidmore deference.  
From the perspective of democratic minimalism, these incursions into 
Chevron’s domain224 are suspect. Chevron provides enough scrutiny to 
block agency actions that amount to domination, but not so much as to 
derail or ossify legitimate agency decision-making processes. There may 
be reasons to provide less deference in some circumstances, but courts 
should articulate clearly why and when additional scrutiny is warranted.  
E. Rethinking Reviewability 
This last point relates not to how judicial review should be conducted, 
but when.  
A raft of administrative law doctrines erect potential barriers to 
obtaining judicial review. These include ripeness, mootness, standing, 
finality, and (in some cases) exhaustion and primary jurisdiction. 
Moreover, contemporary administrative law gives radically divergent 
treatment to agency action and agency failures to act—notwithstanding 
the fact that the APA defines agency action to include the failure to 
act.225 To a democratic minimalist, these doctrines deserve some 
scrutiny, to ensure they are not applied in ways that unfairly harm parties 
in their basic interests. 
Reviewability doctrines serve the important purpose of keeping out of 
the courts matters that should be handled by agencies in the first 
instance.226 And in some instances, courts have pursued this purpose in 
                                                       
221 King, et al. v. Burwell, 576 U.S. __ (2015). 
222 See, e.g., General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline 540 U.S. 581 (2004). 
223 William N. Eskridge & Connor Raso, Chevron as a Canon, not a Precedent: An 
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a manner appropriately sensitive to potential litigants’ interest in access 
to courts. Ripeness doctrine is a good example. In Abbott Laboratories v. 
Gardner, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a pre-
enforcement challenge to a regulation was ripe for judicial review. The 
question of ripeness, the Court held, “require[es] us to evaluate both the 
fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties 
of withholding court consideration.”227 The doctrine works out to 
require pre-enforcement review when delaying judicial review would 
impose a substantial harm on the plaintiff. 
The facts of Abbott Laboratories illustrate how denying pre-enforcement 
review can amount to domination of the regulated party. Abbott, a 
pharmaceutical company, argued that an FDA regulation governing the 
labeling of prescription drugs was invalid. In the absence of pre-
enforcement review, if Abbott wished to challenge the validity of the 
regulation, it would need to defy it, and wait for an enforcement action 
from the FDA. As a defense, Abbott could collaterally challenge the 
validity of the regulation. But even if Abbott took this course and 
ultimately prevailed at trial, for a drug maker to openly defy FDA 
regulations would have ruinous consequences for its reputation.228 In 
effect, then, Abbott had one realistic option: to comply with a regulation 
that was (by hypothesis) invalid. So as a practical matter, a denial of pre-
enforcement review would complete vitiate Abbott’s right to lawful 
agency action. Appropriately, the Supreme Court held that Abbott’s 
challenge was ripe, and pre-enforcement review remains the standard 
practice. 
Other limits on reviewability have developed in ways that work 
substantial unfairness on would-be litigants, however. The way courts 
handle challenges to agency inaction is the chief offender. As noted 
above, the APA provides for review of agency action, and declares that 
agency action includes “failure to act.”229 But in his opinion for the 
Court in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,230 Justice Scalia 
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defined very narrowly the kinds of agency inaction that are subject to 
review. A textual analysis of the definition of agency action led Justice 
Scalia to the conclusion that “a claim under § 706(1) can proceed only 
where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency 
action that is it required to take.”231 Precisely because agencies are granted 
significant discretion even with respect to tasks they must undertake, 
requiring litigants to point to a specific thing that agencies have to do 
comes close to rendering the right to review failures to act a dead letter. 
To a minimalist, this is a problem because agency inaction can pose 
threats to persons’ basic interests just as much as agency actions can. A 
case from the Third Circuit illustrates the point. Hexavalent chromium, 
a chemical compound with certain industrial applications, is a human 
carcinogen, and a potent one. According to a study conducted by 
OSHA, workers exposed to 100 micrograms per cubic meter of 
hexavalent chromium on a daily basis over a working lifetime could 
anticipate excess cancer deaths in the eye-popping range of 88 to 342 per 
1000.232 And yet, OSHA set the permissible exposure limit (PEL) to 100 
micrograms per cubic meter, and failed to lower the limit for over thirty 
years, even once it became clear that the existing standard was grossly 
inadequate to protect human health, and in the face of a lawsuit seeking 
to force the agency to act.233 
Here is a situation where workers’ most basic interest—in life—is 
threatened by the agency’s failure to take action in accordance with its 
mandate to protect workers against toxic materials.234 Minimalism 
highlights how an unnecessarily crabbed reading of the APA’s definition 
of “agency action” makes our system of government less democratic, if 
it arbitrarily subjects persons to substantial harms without possibility of 
remedy. A different reading of the statute could establish at least a rough 
symmetry between the kind of justification an agency has to provide 
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232 Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143, 147 (2002). 
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whether its action or inaction results in serious harm. When parties can 
show that they are harmed in their basic interests by agencies’ failures 
to take actions properly within their power, courts could require 
agencies to explain why, notwithstanding their careful attention to the 
affected interests, other considerations persuasively counseled against 
taking the action requested.  
Other reviewability doctrines also elevate formalism over the protection 
of those vulnerable to exercises of administrative power. Finality 
doctrine, for instance, means that an important class of agency decisions 
evade judicial review entirely, even though they may have substantial 
impacts. Dalton v. Specter235 and Bennett v. Spear236 establish that when the 
formal responsibility for ratifying an agency’s decision rests with the 
President, review is not available: the agency’s work cannot be reviewed 
because it is not final without action by the President, and the 
President’s action cannot be reviewed because the President is not an 
agency. Recent circuit court decisions have held that guidance 
documents advising parties on agency statutory interpretations237 and 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers determinations that private property is 
wetland, and hence protected under the Clean Water Act,238 are not 
final, and therefore not reviewable. As a practical matter, such rulings 
irrevocably foreclose development on the affected lands. Decisions such 
as these effectively strip parties of their legal protection against 
arbitrary agency actions that potentially have serious consequences, and 
therefore are suspect.  
In the case of OSHA and hexavalent chromium, the Third Circuit 
ultimately did order the agency to promulgate a new standard.239 In part, 
the agency had hoist itself on its own petard, by repeatedly 
acknowledging the need to take action and promising to do so, before 
lapsing again and again into lassitude. And the Third Circuit’s ruling 
only came after more than thirty years of delay on the agency’s part. 
From the standpoint of democratic minimalism, it should not be so 
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difficult to have courts force agencies to do their job when lives are at 
stake.240  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The previous Part laid out a model of judicial review in administrative 
law aimed at reducing domination. The basic prescription is for a 
baseline of reasonableness review, with elevated scrutiny under 
circumstances where agency failures appear to have caused parties 
significant harm to their basic interests. I played out the implications of 
this way of looking at judicial review for Chevron review, for the kinds of 
reasons agencies should have to give, and for the availability of review.  
Some might object that these prescriptions for judicial review ask courts 
to do work for which they are not cut out. Specifically, tying the 
intensity of review to the impact agency action has on parties requires 
judgments from courts that are both fact-intensive and value-based. 
What impacts an agency action has on people is an empirical question, 
and not always an easy one to answer. And judgments about what kinds 
of harms count as serious necessarily involve contestable assumptions 
about what interests are really important. 
Relatedly, one might conclude that this framework for review is 
especially ill-suited to complex, technical regulatory environments—
which are so many of the environments in which agencies are active. 
The human dimension can be hard to see when it comes to, for instance, 
the regulation of power grids. What guidance, if any, can minimally 
democratic administrative law provide to courts working in this or 
similar areas? 
These objections have some force: this minimally democratic 
conception would change aspects of judicial review, and not necessarily 
in ways that play to courts’ strengths. I do not dismiss them, and to the 
extent they are convincing, they are reasons against reworking judicial 
review along the lines described above. But I do argue that these 
objections are not as compelling as they might appear at first glance.  
First, while the minimalist framework would require courts to make 
assessments of the potential harm that agency actions pose, it is 
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important to be clear about when and why this might be difficult for 
judges. Assessing harms in general is by no means outside of judges’ skill 
set. Courts must judge harm to parties, for instance, in determining 
whether to grant a preliminary injunction.241 Judges sometimes 
determine both compensatory and punitive damages.242 The Mathews v. 
Eldridge due process framework requires courts to assess the adverse 
impact that agency procedures have on claimants who appear before the 
agency.243 While the analysis prescribed above for determining whether 
heightened scrutiny is warranted is not identical to any of these, it is not 
necessarily any more difficult or more unpredictable, at least much of 
the time.244 
Complex and technical regulatory environments pose difficulties for 
judicial review in general: courts reviewing agency choices in areas 
requiring subject-specific expertise can quickly find themselves out of 
their depth. What is most distinctive about the minimalist framework 
is that it requires courts to assess whether the agency action threatens 
serious harm to persons. Complex and technical areas are likely to pose 
greater challenges for the minimalist framework of review review, 
relative to other forms of judicial review, only insofar as this inquiry into 
the potential for harm is a difficult one in these areas. But frequently, 
these assessments will not require technical knowledge, even in 
technical areas. For instance: the regulation of nuclear power plant 
safety is an immensely technical field. But the potential impact of a 
regulatory failure on people’s basic interests is readily apparent. If a 
party makes a credible claim that a decision by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission to waive fire safety requirements for certain reactors gave 
insufficient consideration to the interests of persons living near them, 
                                                       
241 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 141 (describing 
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Michael Heise, more than 30% of cases in which punitive damages were 
requested were tried by judges. Theodore Eisenberg and Michael Heise, Judge-
Jury Difference in Punitive Damages Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, J. 
EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 325, 331 (2011). 
243 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
244 See supra text accompanying notes 176 to 178, and Jud Mathews, Deference 
Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349 (2013), on the unpredictability of judicial review. 
 
 
 
 
60 MINIMALLY DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIVE LAW  
 
 
then a reviewing court should demand a clear showing from the agency 
to the contrary.245 
* 
The need to reconcile the fact of administrative power with our 
democratic commitments animates so much of administrative law, but 
just what does a commitment to democratic governance entail? A 
minimalist might argue that the core idea of democracy is not 
representation, or deliberation, or even electoral accountability, but the 
principle of non-domination. This Article has reevaluated a cornerstone 
of administrative law, the review of agency action by courts, from the 
standpoint of democratic minimalism. I have argued from minimalist 
premises in favor of a variable intensity of review framework that 
combines a default norm of reasonableness review with the possibility 
for more intensive scrutiny when the risk of domination is higher. I have 
also weighed in, from this perspective, on debates over the scope of 
Chevron review, the admissibility of political reasons to justify agency 
action, and the availability of judicial review.  
This project is, in important respects a modular one: the argument has 
different stages, and one could accept some while rejecting others. One 
could agree that the conceptions of democracy reflected in 
contemporary administrative thinking are problematic and disagree 
that a minimalist approach is preferable. Or one could endorse a 
minimalist conception of democracy but reject one oriented around the 
concept of non-domination. One could even accept this particular 
minimalist conception of democracy and disagree about what it implies 
for judicial review. Indeed, the framework for judicial review outlined 
above is intended to be more illustrative than definitive. The ultimate 
ambition of this Article is not to offer a comprehensive prescription for 
administrative reform so much as it is to stimulate further attention to 
the important question of what our democratic commitments mean for 
our administrative practices.  
 
                                                       
245 See Brodsky v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 783 F.Supp.2d 448 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the agency had adequately taken safety 
considerations into account in granting the waiver). 
